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WHAT	WE	DON'T	SEE	WHEN	WE	SEE	COPYRIGHT	AS	PROPERTY		--JESSICA	LITMAN*		 ABSTRACT	
It	 is	 becoming	 increasingly	 clear	 that	 the	 supposed	 copyright	 wars	 that	
copyright	scholars	believed	we	were	fighting	–	nominally	pitting	the	interests	
of	authors	and	creators	against	the	interests	of	readers	and	other	members	of	
the	audience	–	were	never	really	about	that	at	all.	Instead	the	real	conflict	has	
been	 between	 the	 publishers,	 record	 labels,	 movie	 studios,	 and	 other	
intermediaries	who	 rose	 to	market	 dominance	 in	 the	 20th	 century,	 and	 the	
digital	 services	 and	 platforms	 that	 have	 become	 increasingly	 powerful	
copyright	players	 in	 the	21st.	 In	 this	essay,	 I	argue	that	 it	would	make	good	
sense	for	at	least	some	of	us	to	leave	the	fight	between	20th	century	publishers	
and	21st	century	platforms	to	the	many	lawyers	that	represent	both	sides,	and	
to	 focus	on	some	of	 the	 issues	 that	aren’t	as	 likely	 to	attract	 their	attention.	
While	copyright	scholars	have	been	writing	about	whether	authors'	interests	
or	readers'	interests	should	be	paramount,	we’ve	missed	the	opportunity	to	look	
more	closely	at	the	issues	that	the	copyright	wars	obscured.	Here	is	one:	For	all	
of	the	rhetoric	about	the	central	place	of	authors	in	the	copyright	scheme,	our	
copyright	 laws	 in	 fact	give	them	little	power	and	 less	money.	 Intermediaries	
own	the	copyrights,	and	are	able	to	structure	licenses	so	as	to	maximize	their	
                                               
*	 John	F	Nickoll	Professor	of	Law	and	Professor	of	Information,	University	of	Michigan.	This	essay	is	adapted	from	the	13th	Annual	University	of	Cambridge	Centre	for	Intellectual	Property	and	Information	Law	International	Intellectual	Property	Lecture,	delivered	at	Emmanuel	College	on	13	March,	2018.	I'm	grateful	to	Jon	Weinberg,	Rebecca	Giblin,	Lionel	Bentley,	Gautam	Hans,	Pam	Samuelson,	Kirsten	Carlson,	and	Laura	Harlow	for	their	extremely	helpful	comments	and	suggestions.		 	 I	first	learned	about	the	Dawes	Act	from	Judge	Betty	Binns	Fletcher,	when	she	was	working	on	her	en	banc	opinion	in	Blackfeet	Tribe	of	Indians	v.	State	of	Montana,	729	F.2d	1192	(9th	Cir.	1984),	aff'd	471	US	759	(1985).		I	was	lucky	to	clerk	for	Judge	Fletcher	that	year,	and	her	continuing	encouragement	and	support	was	immensely	helpful	in	my	career	as	a	legal	scholar.	Judge	Fletcher	died	in	2012	at	the	age	of	89,	an	active	senior	judge	who	was	still	carrying	a	full	case	load.		According	to	the	New	York	Times,	she	presided	over	a	9th	Circuit	hearing	a	week	before	her	death.				Douglas	Martin,	“Betty	Binns	Fletcher	Dies	at	89;	Liberal	Stalwart	on	the	Bench”,	New	York	Times,	24	October	2012,	at	https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/25/us/betty-binns-fletcher-liberal-federal-judge-dies-at-89.html.		
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own	revenue	while	shrinking	their	pay-outs	to	authors.	Copyright	scholars	have	
tended	to	treat	 this	point	superficially,	because	—	as	 lawyers	—	we	take	 for	
granted	that	copyrights	are	property;	property	rights	are	freely	alienable;	and	
the	 grantee	 of	 a	 property	 right	 stands	 in	 the	 shoes	 of	 the	 original	 holder.	 I	
compare	 the	 1710	 Statute	 of	 Anne,	 which	 created	 statutory	 copyrights	 and	
consolidated	them	in	the	hands	of	publishers	and	printers,	with	the	1887	Dawes	
Act,	which	served	a	crucial	function	in	the	American	divestment	of	Indian	land.	
I	draw	from	the	stories	of	the	two	laws	the	same	moral:	Constituting	something	
as	a	freely	alienable	property	right	will	almost	always	lead	to	results	mirroring	
or	exacerbating	disparities	in	wealth	and	bargaining	power.	The	legal	dogma	
surrounding	property	rights	makes	it	easy	for	us	not	to	notice.			 If	you	follow	copyright	law,	it	can't	have	escaped	your	attention	that,	in	the	United	States,	the	community	of	copyright	law	scholars	has	been	deeply	polarized	for	the	past	25	years.		Some	of	us	see	ourselves	as	advocates	for	the	undervalued	interests	of	readers	and	other	users;	others	argue	that	we	need	to	increase	the	copyright	protection	we	give	to	authors.	It's	gotten	a	little	ugly.1		We've	called	one	another	bad	names.2	Advocates	for	copyright	owners	have	described	scholars	who	defend	the	rights	of	users	as	hired	guns	paid	 by	 Google	 to	 write	 papers	 advancing	 its	 business	 interests.3	 	 Some	 of	 us	 have	
                                               1	 See,	e.g.,	Tracy	Reilly,	“Copyright	and	a	Synergistic	Society”	(2017)	18	Minnesota	Journal	of	Law,	Science	&	Technology	575,	591-609	(analysing	scholarship	arguing	for	limits	on	copyright	and	attributing	the	authors'	views	to	“copyright	envy”).		2	 See,	e.g.,	Hugh	Hansen,	David	O.	Carson,	Eben	Moglen,	Wendy	Seltzer	&	Charles	Sims,	“Mickey	Mice?	Potential	Ramifications	of	Eldred	v.	Ashcroft”	(2003)	13	Fordham	Intellectual	Property	Media	&	Entertainment	Law	Journal	771,	787	(“the	anti-copyright	professors”);	Henry	Horbaczewski,	“No	Silver	Lining	for	the	Emperor's	New	Clothes:	Golan	and	the	Traditional	Contours	of	Copyright”	(2012)	59	Journal	of	the	Copyright	Society	of	the	USA	865,	865	(2012)	(“scholars	that	viewed	the	copyright	law	as	a	constitutional	abomination”);	I.	Fred	Koenigsberg,	“The	Fifth	Annual	Christopher	Meyer	Memorial	Lecture:		Humpty	Dumpty	in	Copyright	Land”	(2004)		51	Journal	of	the	Copyright	Society	of	the	USA	677,	680	(“enemies	of	copyright”);	Mark	A	Lemley,	Faith-Based	Intellectual	Property	(2015)		62	UCLA		Law	Review	1328,	1343	(“the	IP	faithful”);	Reilly,	note	1		above,	at	p.	625	(“anti-author	proponents”);	ibid.	at	p.	626	(“if	one	reads	professorial	accounts	such	as	these	closely,	one	can	also	detect	the	perfidious	underlying	presence	of	'copyright	envy'”);	Pam	Samuelson,	The	Copyright	Grab,	WIRED,	1	Jan.		1996,	at	https://www.wired.com/1996/01/white-paper/		(“copyright	maximalists”);	Paul	Schwartz	&	William	Michael	Treanor,		“Essay,		Eldred	and	Lochner:		Copyright	Term	Extension	and	Intellectual	Property	as	Constitutional	Property”	(2003)	112	Yale	Law	Journal	2331,	2331	(“the	IP	Restrictors”).		Cf.	Kembrew	McLeod,	Freedom	of	Expression		(New	York	2005),		65	(referring	to	copyright	bullies	as	“overzealous	copyright	bozos”).		3	 See	Brody	Mullins	&	Jack	Nickas,	“Inside	Google's	Academic	Influence	Campaign”	Wall	Street	Journal,	14	July	2017,	at	https://www.wsj.com/articles/paying-professors-inside-googles-academic-
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stopped	reading	the	work	of	scholars	perceived	to	be	on	the	other	side.4				 I	believe	(or	at	least	I	hope)	that	that	whole	sorry	era	is	almost	over,	or	will	be	over	as	soon	as	we	forgive	one	another	for	all	the	nasty	name-calling.		As	concrete	reform	proposals	have	emerged	from	the	muck,	it	has	become	apparent	that	what	was	billed	as	a	conflict	between	authors	and	users	was	never	about	that	at	all.		Instead,	what's	been	going	on	is	a	fight	to	the	death	among	intermediaries.		The	highly	publicized	record	label	lawsuits	against	 individual	users	of	peer-to-peer	 file	sharing	applications5	 turn	out	to	have	been	a	feint	in	a	fight	to	hold	internet	service	providers	liable	for	the	activity	of	their	subscribers.6	Bitter	complaints	about	online	consumer	piracy7	were	largely	a	prelude	to	efforts	 by	major	 copyright	 owners	 to	 narrow	 the	 safe	 harbours	 for	 online	 services.8	Legacy	intermediaries	(by	which	I	mean	publishers,	record	labels,	and	movie	studios)	are	 fighting	 with	 new-fangled	 intermediaries	 (that	 is,	 online	 service	 providers,	platforms,	and	digital	delivery	businesses);	what	they	are	really	fighting	about	is	who	gets	to	eat	the	biggest	piece	of	pie.9	
                                               influence-campaign-1499785286;	Adam	Rogers,	“Google's	Academic	Influence	Campaign:		It's	Complicated”	WIRED,	14	July		2017	at		https://www.wired.com/story/googles-academic-influence-campaign-its-complicated/.			4	 See	Jessica	Litman,	“War	&	Peace:		The	34th	Annual	Donald	C	Brace	Lecture”	(2006)	53		Journal	of	the	Copyright	Society	of	the	USA	1;	Jessica	Litman,	“The	Politics	of	Intellectual	Property”	(2009)		27	Cardozo	Arts	&	Entertainment	Law	Journal	313.		5	 See,	e.g.,	Capitol	Records	v	Thomas-Rasset,	692	F.3d	899	(8th	Cir.	2012);	Sony	BMG	Music	
Entertainment	v	Tenenbaum,	660	F.3d	487	(1st	Cir.	2011).		6	 E.g.,	BMG	Rights	Management	v	Cox	Communications,	881	F.3d	293	(4th	Cir.	2018);	EMI	Christian	Music	
v	MP3Tunes,	844	F.3d	79	(2d	Cir.	2016).	See	Cory	Doctorow,	Information	Doesn't	Want	to	Be	Free:	
Laws	for	the	Internet	Age	(San	Francisco	2014)	80-89.		 			7	 See,	e.g.,	Privacy	and	Piracy:		The	Paradox	of	Illegal	File	Sharing	on	Peer-to-Peer	Networks	and	the	Impact	of	Technology	on	the	Entertainment	Industry,	Hearing	Before	the	Permanent	Subcommittee	on	Investigations	of	the	Senate	Committee	on	Government	Affairs,	108th	Congress		(30	September	2003)	19-20	(testimony	of	L.L.	Cool,	recording	artist);		Promoting	Investment	and	Protecting	Commerce	Online:		Legitimate	Sites	vs.	Para-sites,	Hearing	Before	the	Subcommittee	On	Intellectual	Property	of	the	House	Judiciary	Committee,	112th	Congress	(14	March	2011)	61-62	(testimony	of	Frederick	Huntsberry,	Paramount	Pictures).		8	 See,	e.g.,	United	States	Copyright	Office:		Section	512		Public	Roundtable,	2	May		2016,	at	https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/public-roundtable/transcript_05-02-2016.pdf.				9	 See,	e.g.,	Robert	Levine,	Free	Ride:		How	the	Internet	is	Destroying	the	Culture	Business	and	How	the	
Culture	Business	Can	Fight	Back	(London	2011);	Jonathan	Taplin,	Move	Fast	and	Break	Things:		How	
Facebook,	Google,	and	Amazon	Cornered	Culture	and	Undermined	Democracy	(New	York	2017);	Guy	Pessach,	“Deconstructing	Disintermediation:		A	Skeptical	Copyright	Perspective”	(2013)	31	Cardozo	
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	 Copyright	scholars	can	safely	leave	them	to	work	it	out	without	our	help.	If	the	core	 question	 in	 that	 dispute	 is	 whether	 the	 law	 ought	 to	 favour	 publishers	 over	platforms	 or	 vice	 versa,	 the	 answer	 is	 unlikely	 to	 significantly	 change	 the	 copyright	ecosystem.		Neither	side	has	much	of	a	claim	to	the	moral	high	ground.10	The	players	on	both	sides	are	large,	well-financed	businesses	with	lots	of	lawyers	in	harness,	so	they	don't	particularly	need	the	assistance	of	legal	scholarship.		That	debate	is	less	compelling	from	a	theoretical	or	policy	perspective	than	many	other	problems	the	copyright	system	faces.		If	the	distribution	of	goodies	among	old-fangled	and	new-fangled	intermediaries	won't	have	much	 impact	on	decisions	 surrounding	 the	balance	 the	 law	should	 strike	among	writers	and	readers,	many	scholars	will	lose	interest	in	this	particular	conflict.		So,	after	we	get	our	feet	extracted	from	all	the	mud	we've	thrown	at	each	other,	I	expect	that	the	community	of	copyright	scholars	will	move	on	to	more	intriguing	issues.		 In	 this	 essay,	 I	 hope	 to	 do	 two	 things.	 	 First,	 I'd	 like	 to	 focus	 attention	 on	 an	important	issue	that	should	have	been	central	to	our	prior	debates,	but	somehow	wasn't:		For	all	of	the	rhetoric	about	the	central	place	of	authors	in	the	copyright	scheme,	our	copyright	 laws	 in	 fact	 give	 them	 little	 power	 and	 less	 money.	 	 	 	 If	 a	 legal	 regime	purportedly	designed	for	the	benefit	of	authors	systematically	short-changes	them,	why	does	 that	 happen,	 and	what	 options	might	we	 have	 to	 respond?	 	 Copyright	 scholars	mention	this	problem	often,11	but	have	only	rarely	given	it	sustained	attention.	Second,	
                                               Arts	&	Entertainment		Law	Journal	833;	Mary	Rasenberger	&	Christine	Pepe,	“Copyright	Enforcement	and	Online	File	Hosting	Services:	Have	Courts	Struck	the	Proper	Balance”	(2012)	59	Journal	of	the	Copyright	Soc'y	U.S.A.	627.	Compare	Stephen	E	Siwek,	Copyright	Industries	in	the	U.S.	Economy:		2016	Report	(2016),	at	http://www.iipawebsite.com/pdf/2016CpyrtRptFull.PDF,	with	Computer	and	Communications	Industry	Association,	Fair	Use	Industries	in	the	U.S.	Economy:		Economic	Contributions	of	Industries	Relying	on	Fair	Use	(2017),	at	http://www.ccianet.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Fair-Use-in-the-U.S.-Economy-2017.pdf;	US	Copyright	Office,	Section	512	Study,	https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/	(2017)	(public	comments	and	transcripts	of	public	roundtables).		10	See	Jane	C.	Ginsburg,	“The	Place	of	the	Author	in	Copyright”	in	Ruth	L.	Okediji	(ed.),	Copyright	Law	in	
an	Age	of	Exceptions	and	Limitations	(New	York	2017),	60,	66-68.		11	See,	e.g.,	William	Patry,	Moral	Panics	and	the	Copyright	Wars	(Oxford	2009),	117-19;		Daniel	Gervais,	“User-Generated	Content	and	Music	File-Sharing:	A	Look	at	Some	of	the		More	Interesting	Aspects	of	Bill	C-32”	in	Michael	Geist	(ed.),			From	"Radical	Extremism"	to	"Balanced	Copyright":	Canadian	
Copyright	And	The	Digital	Agenda	(Toronto	2010	),	447,	450;	Rebecca	Giblin,	“Reimagining	Copyright's	Duration”	in		Rebecca	Giblin	&	Kimberly	Weatherall	(eds.),	What	If	We	Could	Reimagine	
Copyright?	(2017),	177,	193-96;	Ginsburg,	supra	note	;	P.	Bernt	Hugenholtz,	The	Great	Copyright	Robbery:		Rights	Allocation	in	a	Digital	Environment	(2000),			at	https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/thegreatcopyrightrobbery.pdf;	Molly	Van	Houweling,	“Authors	vs	Owners”	(2016)	54	Houston		Law	Review	371;	Molly	Van	Houweling,	“Distributive	Values	in	Copyright”	(2004)		83	Tex.		Law	Review	1535.		
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I'll	 try	to	offer	an	answer	to	the	question	why	we’ve	devoted	so	little	ink	to	 the	paltry	nature	of	authors'	real-world	copyright	benefits.		This	issue,	after	all,	is	deeply	important	on	both	a	practical	and	theoretical	level,	so	why	don't	we	write	about	it	more?		At	least	part	of	the	answer,	I'll	suggest,	lies	in	the	ways	that	we,	as	lawyers,	think	about	property	rights.		 I.				DISEMPOWERED	AUTHORS		Let	me	acknowledge	my	priors.		21st	century	copyright	law	is	a	complex	system	with	a	bunch	of	interlocking	and	sometimes	inconsistent	purposes,	but	I	believe	that	the	most	important	of	those	purposes	are	these:		First,	copyright	law	should	encourage	authors	to	create	 and	 widely	 disseminate	 works	 of	 authorship;	 second,	 it	 should	 give	 them	meaningful	opportunities	to	earn	money	from	doing	so;	and,	third,	copyright	law	should	encourage	 readers,	 listeners,	 viewers,	 and	 other	 users	 to	 encounter,	 enjoy,	 and	 learn	from	those	works	of	authorship.12	There	are	other	purposes,	but	they're	subsidiary.	To	hijack	a	turn	of	phrase	popularized	by	Amazon.com's	vice	president	Russ	Grandinetti,	the	only	essential	players	in	the	copyright	system	are	the	author	and	the	audience.13				 Of	 course,	 the	 copyright	 system	 needs	 intermediaries	 to	 convey	 the	works	 of	authorship	to	their	audiences	and	to	channel	the	revenues	flowing	from	the	enjoyment	of	those	works	back	to	authors,	but	we	can,	and	I	think	should,	be	agnostic	as	to	whether	the	law	should	favour	any	of	the	competing	intermediaries	over	the	others.		The	most	important	consideration	is	how	well	they	accomplish	their	tasks	of	disseminating	works	to	audiences	and	paying	money	to	authors.14				 So,	let's	look	at	how	they're	doing	at	those	tasks.	How	well	is	the	current	global	copyright	system	working	out	for	authors	and	for	readers?			I've	spent	much	of	my	career	arguing	that	the	copyright	interests	of	readers	and	other	consumers	are	receiving	too	
                                               12	Jessica	Litman,	“Real	Copyright	Reform”	(2010)	96	Iowa	Law	Rev.	1.		See	also,	e.g.,	Doctorow,	note	6	above,	at	pp.	153-54.		13	See	David	Streatfield,	“Amazon	Signs	Up	Authors,	Writing	Publishers	Out	of	Deal”	New	York	Times,	17	Oct.	2011	at	p.	A1(quoting	Grandinetti	as	having	said,	“The	only	really	necessary	people	in	the	publishing	process	now	are	the	writer	and	reader”).		14	Many	intermediaries,	whether	they	are	book	publishers,	online	marketplaces,	or	social	media	platforms,	reasonably	view	their	efforts	at	market	analysis,	strategy,	and	design	to	involve	great	creativity.		Comparable	creativity	is,	of	course,	often	required	to	sell	products,	like	wheelbarrows	or	hot	sauce,	that	are	not	works	of	authorship.		The	fact	that	intermediaries	make	creative	and	valuable	contributions	to	the	copyright	ecosystem	doesn't,	without	more,	make	them	its	indispensable	beneficiaries.		
5
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little	attention.15	The	problems	the	copyright	law	poses	for	readers	haven't	evaporated.		For	one	thing,	at	least	in	the	United	States,	readers	are	paying	for	access	to	the	works	they	encounter	by	giving	up	massive	chunks	of	personal	privacy.16	US	policymakers	are	beginning	to	appreciate	the	risks	of	that	approach,	but	it	may	already	be	too	late	to	mend	them.	For	another,	many	copyright	owners	have	succeeded,	at	least	so	far,	in	their	efforts	to	nullify	 the	 legal	 rights	 that	 the	 copyright	 law	gives	 to	users,	by	purporting	to	bind	consumers	to	overreaching	end	user	license	agreements.17		I'm	concerned	that	that	will	end	up	severely	undermining	the	copyright	system	in	the	long	term.	Still,	even	with	those	problems,	to	the	extent	that	one	goal	of	copyright	is	to	give	members	of	the	public	many	opportunities	 to	 enjoy	 a	 large	 variety	 of	 different	works,	 in	 different	 formats	 and	 at	different	price	points,	the	current	system	is	fabulously	successful.		 The	situation	for	authors,	on	the	other	hand,	is	more	depressing.		The	copyright	system,	in	truth,	has	never	been	very	good	at	either	giving	authors	their	choice	of	myriad	channels	for	distributing	their	works	to	the	public,	or	enabling	them	to	earn	meaningful	amounts	of	money	from	doing	so.18		If	an	author's	goals	are	to	communicate	her	works	to	their	best	audience	and	to	earn	an	income	from	doing	so,	her	choices	end	up	being	narrowly	 limited.	 	 Even	 if	 she	 succeeds	 in	 disseminating	 her	work	 through	 the	most	suitable	channel,	she	needs	to	accept	that	the	intermediary	who	operates	that	channel	will	likely	both	control	the	distribution	of	her	works	and	keep	most	of	the	money	those	works	earn.19				 In	 the	 18th,	 19th,	 and	 20th	 centuries,	 this	 bargain	 probably	 seemed	 pretty	
                                               15	See,	e.g.,	Jessica	Litman,	“Copyright	Noncompliance	(Or	Why	we	Can't	‘Just	Say	Yes’	to	Licensing)”	(1997)	29	N.Y.U.	Journal	of		International	Law	&	Policy	237;	Jessica	Litman,	“The	Exclusive	Right	to	Read”	(1994)	13	Cardozo	Arts	&	Entertainment		Law	Journal	29;	Jessica	Litman,	“Lawful	Personal	Use”	(2007)	85	Texas	Law	Review	1871.			16	See,	e.g.,	John	M.	Newman,	“The	Myth	of	Free”	(2018)	86	G.W.	Law	Rev.	513,		551-55;	Geoffrey	A.	Fowler,	“Your	Data	is	Way	More	Exposed	than	You	Think”,	Wall	Street	Journal,		24	May	2017,	at	https://www.wsj.com/articles/your-data-is-way-more-exposed-than-you-realize-1495657390;	Sam	Schechner	&	Nick	Kostove,	Google	and	Facebook	Likely	to	Benefit	from	Europe's	Privacy	Crackdown,	Wall	Street	Journal,	23	April		2017,	at	https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-europes-new-privacy-rules-favor-google-and-facebook-1524536324.		17	See		Aaron	Perzanowski	&	Jason	Schultz,	The	End	of	Ownership	(Cambridge,	MA	2016),	15-101;	Margaret	Jane	Radin,	Boilerplate		(Princeton	2013),	33-51,	168-76;	see,	e.g.,	Lewis	Hyde,	Common	As	
Air:		Revolution,	Art,	and	Ownership	(New	York	2010),	66-68.		18	See,	e.g.,		Doctorow,	note	6	above,	at	pp.	xxii-xxv.		19	See	Litman,	note	12	above,	at	pp.	8-12.		
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reasonable.	 	 Paper	 was	 expensive.20	 	 Mass	 distribution	 required	 paper,	 along	 with	printing	presses,	bookstores,	warehouses,	 trucks,	movie	 cameras	and	movie	 theatres,	broadcast	towers	and	communications	satellites	–	required,	in	other	words,	a	significant	capital	investment.21		It	made	sense	in	that	context	to	expect	that	as	the	revenues	from	works	of	authorship	flowed	from	users	to	authors,	most	of	the	money	would	be	diverted	along	the	way	to	pay	for	expensive	reproduction	and	distribution	solutions.		 In	the	21st	century,	that	explanation	doesn't	seem	so	reasonable.	 	At	least	some	popular	 	reproduction	and	distribution	alternatives	are	much	 less	expensive	than	the	older	 sorts.22	 	 Digital	 reproduction,	 digital	 downloads,	 and	 online	 streaming	 can	 be	downright	cheap	–	the	fact	that	anyone	can	afford	to	do	it	is	said	to	be	a	primary	driver	of	increasing	consumer	piracy.23	 	By	all	accounts,	moreover,	the	money	attributable	to	the	 distribution	 and	 enjoyment	 of	 works	 of	 authorship	 is	 at	 an	 all-time	 high.24	 Yet	creators	report	that	they	are	being	paid	much	less	than	they	used	to	be	paid.25			
                                               20	See	Michael	A.	Carroll,	“Whose	Music	is	it	Anyway?		How	We	Came	to	View	Musical	Expression	as	a	Form	of	Property”	(2004)	72	University	of		Cincinnati		Law	Review	1405,	1471.		21	See,	e.g.,	Jessica	Litman,	“Sharing	and	Stealing”	(2004)	26	Hastings	Communication	&	Entertainment	Law	Journal	1,	2.		22	See,	e.g.,	Hyde,	note	17	above,	at	pp.	64-65;	Mark	A	Lemley,	“IP	in	a	World	Without	Scarcity”	(2015)	90	NYU		Law	Review	460,	482-94.		23	See,	e.g.,	Orin	Kerr,	“A	Lukewarm	Defense	of	the	Digital	Millennium	Copyright	Act”	in	Adam	Thierer	&	Clyde	Wayne	Crews	(eds.),	CopyFights:		The	Future	of	Intellectual	Property	in	the	Information	Age	(Washington	2002),	163,	165-67;	Fred	Von	Lohmann,	“Measuring	the	Digital	Millennium	Copyright	Act	Against	the	Darknet:		Implications	for	the	Regulation	of	Technological	Protection	Measures”	(2004)	24	Loyola	Los	Angeles	Entertainment		Law	Review	635,	638-43.			24	See,	e.g.,		Joshua	P.	Friedlander,	RIAA	Year-End	Music	Industry	Revenue	Report,	22	March	2018,	at	http://www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/RIAA-Year-End-2017-News-and-Notes.pdf;	Stephen	E.	Siwek,	Copyright	Industries	in	the	US	Economy:		The	2016	Report	(Dec.	2016),	at	https://iipa.org/files/uploads/2018/01/2016CpyrtRptFull-1.pdf;	Andrew	Szamosszegi	and	Mary	Ann	McCleary,	Fair	Use	in	the	US	Economy	(2017),	at	https://www.ccianet.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Fair-Use-in-the-U.S.-Economy-2017.pdf.		Reports	focusing	on	particular	income	streams	earned	by	some	legacy	intermediaries	don't	count	all	of	the	revenue	that	new-fangled	intermediaries	are	collecting	as	a	result	of	the	online	dissemination	of	works	of	authorship.		See,	e.g.,		Statista,	Dossier:		Film	Industry	in	the	U.S.	(2018)	at	https://www.statista.com/study/11472/film-industry-in-the-united-states-statista-dossier/.			That	money	is	of	course	part	of	the	total	that	should	be	available	for	author	compensation.		Moreover,		those	industry	sector-specific	reports	indicate	that	legacy	intermediaries	are	earning	impressive	profits,	despite	the	large	amounts	of	money	paid	to	platforms	and	other	new-fangled	intermediaries.		See,	e.g.,		ibid.;	Friedlander,	above,	at	p.	1.		25	See,	e.g.,	Katherine	Cowdray,	“ALCS	survey	finds	15%	drop	in	average	author	earnings	since	2013”		The	Bookseller,	27	June	2018,	at	https://www.thebookseller.com/news/alcs-reveals-average-author-
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8 
	 Some	of	the	explanation	for	that	might	relate	to	the	winner-take-all	structure	of	many	 of	 the	 copyright	 intensive	 industries.	 	 J.K.	 Rowling,26	 Damien	 Hirst,27	 Beyoncé	Knowles,28	George	Lucas,29	and	Lin	Manual	Miranda30	have	earned	a	bunch	of	money	from	their	works	of	authorship.		The	majority	of	creators,	in	contrast,	regularly	face	the	choice	of	living	perilously	close	to	the	poverty	line	or	working	at	a	day	job	to	support	
                                               earnings-even-lower-four-years-ago-818891;	David	Dupont,	“Composer	Maria	Schneider	Warns	Students	about	the	Future	of	the	Music	Industry”	Bowling	Green	Independent	News,	31	March	2018,	at	http://bgindependentmedia.org/composer-maria-schneider-warns-students-about-the-future-of-the-music-industry/;	Malcolm	Harris,	“How	Much	is	a	Word	Worth?”	Medium,	16	April	2018	at	https://medium.com/s/story/how-much-is-a-word-worth-7fcd131a341c;	Douglas	Preston,	“Why	is	it	So	Goddamned	Hard	to	Make	a	Living	as	a	Writer	Today?”	(Summer	2017)	Authors	Guild	Bulletin	63.		26	See	James	B.	Stewart,	“In	the	Chamber	of	Secrets:		J.K.	Rowling's	Net	Worth”		New	York	Times,	24	November	2016,	at	https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/business/in-the-chamber-of-secrets-jk-rowlings-net-worth.html.		27	See	 Eileen	 Kinsella,	 “D am i e n 	 H i r s t 	 a n d 	 A n i s h 	 K a p oo r 	 L a nd 	 o n 	 UK 	 R i c h 	 L i s t 	( Ag a i n ) ” 	 A r t ne t 	 N ews ,	8	May		2017,	at	https://news.artnet.com/art-world/artists-on-sunday-times-rich-list-952055.		28	See	Zack	O'Malley	Greenburg,	“The	World's	Highest	Paid	Women	in	Music	2017”	Forbes,	20	November	2017,	at	https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2017/11/20/the-worlds-highest-paid-women-in-music-2017/.		29	See	Zack	O'Malley	Greenburg,	“America's	Wealthiest	Celebrities:		The	Top	10	by	Net	Worth”		Forbes,	18	December	2017,	at	https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2017/12/18/americas-wealthiest-celebrities-2017-the-top-ten-by-net-worth/.		30	See	Michael	Paulson	&		David	Gelles,	“Hamilton,	Inc.:		The	Path	to	a	Billion-Dollar	Broadway	Show”	8	June	2016,	at	https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/12/theater/hamilton-inc-the-path-to-a-billion-dollar-show.html.		
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their	families.31		But	that	isn't	a	new	thing.32	If	creators	are	earning	even	less	than	they	used	to,	there	are	other	factors	at	work.		 This	is	a	complicated	problem	with	multiple	causes,	but	one	of	the	causes	is	that	many	of	the	intermediaries	in	our	story	have	recently	figured	out	ways	to	earn	more	but	pay	authors	less.		I	alluded	earlier	to	the	conflict	between	old-fangled	and	new-fangled	intermediaries.		The	legacy	intermediaries	seem	to	be	incensed	that	service	providers	and	platforms	are	collecting	a	large	share	of	the	revenues	earned	by	copyrighted	works.		They've	invented	a	catch	phrase,	the	“value	gap,”	to	describe	their	complaint,	which	is	that	the	new-fangled	intermediaries	have	too	much	bargaining	power	and	are	able	to	use	that	 bargaining	 power	 to	 negotiate	 lower	 license	 fees	 than	 the	 legacy	 intermediaries	believe	 that	 they	 should	 pay.33	 	 Publishers,	 record	 labels,	 and	motion	 picture	 studios	argue	that	lawmakers	should	change	the	law	to	tilt	the	playing	field	in	their	favour,	so	that	they	can	bargain	for	higher	fees.34		Meanwhile,	though,	they	are	making	up	for	what	
                                               31	See,	e.g.,	Todd	London	&	Ben	Pesner,	Outrageous	Fortune:		The	Life	and	Times	of	the	New	American	
Play	(New	York	2009),	50-96;	Rachel	Deahl,	“New	Guild	Survey	Reveals	Majority	of	Authors	Earn	Below	Poverty	Line”		Publishers	Weekly,	Sept.	11,	2015,	at	https://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/publisher-news/article/68008-new-guild-survey-reveals-majority-of-authors-earn-below-poverty-line.html	;	Johanna	Gibson,	Phillip	Johnson,	&	Gaetano	Dimita,	The	Business	of	Being	and	Author:		A	Survey	of	Authors'	Earnings	and	Contracts	(April	2015),	at	https://orca.cf.ac.uk/72431/1/Final%20Report%20-%20For%20Web%20Publication.pdf;	Martin	Kretschmer,	“Does	Copyright	Law	Matter?		An	Empirical	Analysis	of	Creators	Earnings”		(21	May	2012),	available	at	SSRN:		https://ssrn.com/abstract=2063735;	Martin	Kretschmer,	Sukpreet	Singh,	Lionel	Bently,	&	Elena	Cooper,		2011	Copyright	Contracts	and	Earnings	of	Visual	Creators:		A	Survey	of	5800	British	Designers,	Fine	Artists,		Illustrators	and	Photographers	(2011),	at	https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/4899875.pdf.			32	See,	e.g.,	Herman	Finklestein,	“The	Copyright	Law:		A	Reappraisal”	(1956)	104	U.	Penn.		Law	Review	1025,	1051;	Maureen	O'Rourke,		“Bargaining	in	the	Shadow	of	Copyright	Law	After	Tasini”	(2003)	53	Case	Western	Reserve		Law	Review	605,	613-14.		33	See	Glenn	Peoples,	“War	of	Words:		Labels	and	Trade	Groups	Target	YouTube's	‘Value	Gap’”	Billboard,	13	April	2016,	at	https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/7333110/war-of-words-labels-trade-groups-youtube-value-gap;	see,	e.g.,	Joint	Comments	of	the	American	Association	of	Independent	Music	et.	al.,	In	re:		Section	512	Study,		31	March		2016,	at	https://www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Music-Community-Submission-in-re-DMCA-512-FINAL-7559445.pdf;	International	Federation	of	the	Phonographic	Industry,	Europe's	Creators,	Cultural	and	Creative	Industries'	Call	to	the	European	Council:		Secure	the	Aims	of	the	Proposed	Copyright	Directive	in	the	DSM	(12	April	2018),	at	http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/EU_Creators_Cultural_and_Creative_Industries_Call_to_European_Council.pdf.			34	See,	e.g.,	IFPI,	Rewarding	Creativity:		Fixing	the	Value	Gap,	http://www.ifpi.org/value_gap.php	(visited	April	19,	2018)	
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they	believe	are	pitifully	inadequate	licensing	fees	by	structuring	the	licensing	deals	to	minimize	their	own	obligation	to	pay	royalties	to	creators.35		If	Spotify	or	YouTube	pays	copyright	 owners	 for	 the	 use	 of	music,	 for	 example,	 by	 giving	music	 publishers	 and	record	labels	an	equity	stake	in	the	company,	or	by	paying	an	annual	up-front	blanket	license	fee,	none	of	that	money	needs	to	be	passed	on	to	composers	or	musicians.36			 In	a	 similar	vein,	publishers	have	 reinterpreted	extant	 contracts	and	 redrafted	new	 contracts	 to	 reduce	 the	 royalty	 rates	 for	 digital	 distribution	 of	 the	 works	 they	control.	 	In	standard	20th	century	book	and	music	publishing	and	recording	contracts,	authors	were	paid	a	small	percentage	of	revenue	for	the	manufacture	and	distribution	of	hard	 copies	 and	 a	 larger	 share	 of	 the	 income	 from	 licensing	 the	 work	 to	 another	business.37		That	made	sense;	the	smaller	royalty	for	hard	copies	reflected	the	expense	of	 manufacturing	 and	 distributing	 the	 copies,	 neither	 of	 which	 were	 implicated	 by	licensing	deals.		When	publishers	and	record	labels	licensed	works	to	music	and	eBook	distribution	services	to	enable	the	services	to	make	the	works	available	for	paid	digital	downloads,	 though,	 they	 insisted	 that	 they	 need	 only	 pay	 the	 lower	 royalty	 rate	
                                               	35	See,	e.g.,	Kristiella	Garcia,		“Private	Copyright	Reform”	(2013)	20	Mich.	Telecom.	7	Technology		Law	Review	1,	22-23,	27-29.		36	See,	e.g.,		19	Recordings	v.	Sony	Music	Entertainment,	No.	14-CV-1056	(SDNY	filed	24	June	2015);		Zack	O'Malley	Greenburg,		“Revenge	of	The	Record	Labels:	How	the	Majors	Renewed	Their	Grip	on	Music”,	Forbes,	15	April	2015,	at	https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2015/04/15/revenge-of-the-record-labels-how-the-majors-renewed-their-grip-on-music.		In	2016,	major	record	labels	in	the	United	States	announced	that	musicians	would	eventually	be	paid	a	share	of	the	profits	that	the	labels	earned	from	selling	their	equity	stakes	in	Spotify,	but	have	been	slow	to	disclose	specifics.			Zack	O'Malley	Greenburg,	“Spotify	Goes	Public	at	$30	Billion.		When	will	Artists	See	Any	of	That?”	Forbes,	3	April	2018,	at	https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2018/04/03/spotify-ipo-goes-public-at-30-billion-when-will-artists-see-any-of-that.	Sony	Music	Entertainment	sold	half	of	its	equity	stake	on	Spotify	in	April	of	2018,	earning	an	estimated	$761	million.			In	June	of	2018,	the	company	promised	that	it	would	pass	along	a	portion	of	the	proceeds	from	the	sale	to	artists	and	independent	labels	beginning	in	August.		See	Melinda	Newman,	“Sony	Music	Entertainment	to	Start	Paying	Indie	Artists	and	Labels	Spotify	Sale	Proceeds	as	Early	as	August”		Billboard,	14	June	2018,	at	https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8461117/sony-music-canada-spotify-pay-indie-artists-labels.	Warner	Music	sold	75%	of	its	stake	in	Spotify	in	May	of	2018,	but,	as	of	this	writing,	has	not	revealed	its	plans	for	sharing	the	money	with	creators.		37	See,	e.g.,	Richard	Curtis,	How	to	Be	Your	Own	Literary	Agent:		An	Insider's	Guide	to	Getting	Your	Book	
Published	(New	York	2003),	62-76,	295-97;	Nina	Aragon,	“Note:		Calculating	Artists'	Royalties:		An	Analysis	of	the	Courts'	Dualistic		Interpretations	of	Recording	Contracts	Negotiated	in	a	Pre-Digital	Age”	(2017)	2017	Cardozo		Law	Review	De	Novo	180,	184-88;	Lawrence	Blake	&	Daniel	K.	Stuart,	“Analysis	of	a	Recording	Contract”	in	Mark	Halloran	(ed.)	The	Musician's	Business	and	Legal	Guide	(Upper	Saddle	River	2008),	282,	312-13.			
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designated	for	the	sale	of	hard	copies,	and	that's	the	rate	that	they	paid.38			 On	one	level,	none	of	this	should	surprise	us.		Of	course,	the	people	who	control	the	terms	and	conditions	of	use	will	structure	those	terms	and	conditions	in	ways	that	best	advance	their	own	interests.		What	I	find	notable	is	how	little	attention	these	recent	moves	have	attracted	from	legal	scholars.		Indeed,		even	though	we	are	all	likely	aware	of	these	developments	(because	we	live	in	the	world),	if	you	read	most	of	what	American	copyright	scholars	have	written	about	copyright	revision,	you'd	conclude	we	don't	think	that	 these	 developments	 should	 worry	 us	 as	 much	 as	 other	 problems.39	 	 European	scholars	have	recently	paid	somewhat	more	attention	to	this	collection	of	issues	as	part	of	a	contentious	effort	to	revise	the	European	Directive	on	Copyright	in	the	Digital	Single	Market,40	 and	 their	 reports	 have	 been	 dismaying.	 	 Real-world	 creators	 encounter	
                                               38	See,	e.g.,	FBT	Productions	v	Aftermath	Records,	621	F.3d	958	(9th	Cir	2010);	Tavares	v.	Capitol	Records,	LLC,	2013	U.S.	Dist.	LEXIS	34317	(ND	Cal.	2013);	cf.	Keiler	v	Harlequin	Enters.,	751	F.3d	64	(2d	Cir.	2013)(book	publisher	evaded	50%	license	royalty	by	sublicensing	to	its	own	subsidiary	for	an	artificially	low	price).		There's	been	some	litigation	over	this,	with	mixed	results.		One	court	concluded	that	the	plain	language	of	particular	contracts	obliges	record	labels	to	pay	the	larger	licensing	royalty	for	digital	downloads.	FBT	Productions	v	Aftermath	Records,	621	F.3d	at	964-66.		A	different	court	held	that	the	plain	language	of	an	essentially	similar	contract	supports	the	argument	that	royalties	for	digital	download	licenses	should	be	the	same	as	royalties	for	the	sale	of	hard	copies.	
Malmsteen	v		Universal	Music	Group,	940	F.	Supp.	2D		123,	132-33	(SDNY	2013).		39	This	assertion	 is	controversial.	 	 	 Indeed,	 some	scholars	will	 find	 it	offensive.	 	Everyone	who	writes	copyright	scholarship	views	her	work	as	pro-creator	and	pro-creativity,	and	believes	that	her	proposals	will	improve	the	way	the	system	works	for	the	ultimate	benefit	of	creators,	however	defined.					I'm	not	suggesting	that	scholars	have	not	cared	about	creators,	or	have	failed	to	produce	proposals	designed	to	benefit	 them.	 	 I'm	urging,	 rather,	 that	our	scholarship	has	 	paid	 too	 little	attention	 the	practical	obstacles	many	creators	face	in	taking	advantage	of	the	rights	conferred	by	copyright	law	on	copyright	owners.	 	Almost	all	of	us	 (and	 I	don't	exclude	myself)	have	 	 failed	 to	examine	 the	ways	 that	 recent	copyright	practices	and	proposals	give	creators	even	less	money	and	control	than	past	practices	and	proposals.			To	the	extent	that	we	have	an	imperfect	understanding	of	the	mechanics	of	the	copyright	system	in	practice,	our	ideas	for	fixing	it	are	likely	to	fall	short.			40	See	European	Commission,	Proposal	for	a	Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	on	Copyright	in	the	Digital	Single	Market,	14	Sept.		2016,	at	http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-593-EN-F1-1.PDF.	Most	of	the	controversy	centres	on	whether	proposals	to	rebalance	the	law	to	provide	more	robust	rights	to	publishers	and	impose	more	onerous	obligations	on	platforms	are	good	or	bad	policy.		See,	e.g.,	Pamela	Samuelson,	“Legally	Speaking:	The	EU’s	Controversial	Digital	Single	Market	Directive”	61	Communications	of	the	ACM		(forthcoming	November	2018);	“Google	Criticized	for	Push	Against	EU	Copyright	Reform”	Financial	Times,	26	June	2018,	at	https://www.ft.com/content/a8031d7a-78a0-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d;	Martin	Banks,	“MEPs	Rally	Against	Planned	EU	Copyright	Reform”	The	Parliament,		8	June	2018,	at	https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/news/meps-rally-against-planned-eu-copyright-reform;	K.	G.	Orphanides,	“The	EU's	Bizarre	War	on	Memes	is	Totally	Unwinnable”	Wired,	18	June	2018,	at	http://www.wired.co.uk/article/eu-meme-war-article-13-
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significant	obstacles	to	enjoying	the	rights	and	receiving	the	compensation	that	the	law	in	theory	affords	them.41		Yet	proposed	solutions	seem	both	modest	and	unlikely	to	effect	significant	 improvement.42	 Meanwhile,	 even	 those	 small	 correctives	 seem	 as	 if	 they	would	be	unthinkable	additions	to	current	American	efforts	at	copyright	reform.		 		If	all	of	us	can	see	these	issues,	at	least	in	broad	outline,	and	if	at	least	some	of	us	believe	that	these	problems	undermine	the	value	and	legitimacy	of	the	copyright	system,	why	have	we	not	come	up	with	better	suggestions	for	addressing	it?		 One	possibility	is	that	many	of	us	have	concluded	that	it's	hopeless:			the	problem	seems	 insoluble.	 	 Copyright	 intermediaries	 have	 too	 many	 opportunities	 to	 take	advantage	of	creators	and	too	few	reasons	to	refrain	from	exploiting	them.		Over	the	past	three	hundred	years,	copyright	laws	have	incorporated	a	variety	of	provisions	intended	to	 protect	 creators	 from	 overreaching	 intermediaries;	 none	 of	 them	 has	 been	particularly	effective.		In	the	United	States,	our	copyright	history	is	teeming	with	court	decisions	that	gutted	statutory	safeguards	for	authors'	rights.				 Although	US	 copyright	 law	has	 always	 required	 that	 transfers	 of	 copyright	 be	made	only	by	a	signed	writing,43	nineteenth	century	publishers	persuaded	courts	that	that	 prerequisite	 did	 not	 limit	 their	 ability	 to	 secure	 ownership	 of	 the	 copyrights	 in	works	that	had	not	yet	been	published	and	registered.44	The	copyright	renewal	term	was	intended	 to	 enable	 an	 author	 who	 had	 assigned	 her	 copyright	 in	 the	 first	 term	 to	renegotiate	 the	 terms	 of	 any	 licenses	 or	 assignments.45	 In	 1943,	 however,	 music	
                                               regulation.	41	See,	e.g.,	Lionel	Bently,	Between	a	Rock	and	a	Hard	Place:		The	Problems	Facing	Freelance	Creators	in	the	UK	Media	Marketplace,	A	Briefing	Document	on	Behalf	of	the	Creators	Rights	Alliance,	29	June	2009,	at	http://www.creatorsrights.org.uk/media/between.pdf;			Gibson,	et.	al.,	note	31	above;	Kretschmer,	note		31	above.		42	Chapter	3	of	the	current	draft	EU	directive	would	oblige	member	states	to	ensure	that	authors	and	performers	receive	regular	reports	on	the	revenue	generated	by	their	works	and	the	remuneration	to	which	they	are	entitled,	and	to	provide	mechanisms	for	authors	and	performers	to	request	additional	remuneration	when	the	revenues	earned	from	their	works	are	grossly	disproportionate	to	the	revenues	anticipated	when	a	copyright	assignment	or	licensing	agreement	was	negotiated.	See	note	40,	above.	43	See,	e.g.,	Copyright	Act	of	1790,	§	2,	1	Stat.	124,	1st	Cong.	2d	Sess.		(1790);	Act.	Of	February	3,	1831,	§	§	6,	7,	21st	Cong.	2d	Sess.	(1831);	Rev.	Stat.	§	§	4964,	4965.			44	See,	e.g.,	Parton	v	Prang,		18	F.	Cas.	1273,	1278	(C.C.D.	Mass.	1872);	Lawrence	v	Dana,	15	F.	Cas.	26	(C.C.D.	Mass	1869);	Pulte	v	Derby,	20	F.	Cas.	51	(C.C.	D.	Ohio	1852).		See	generally	Jessica	Litman,	What	Notice	Did	(2016)	96	Boston	University	Law	Review	717,	724-31.		45	H.R.	Rep.	No.	2222,	60th	Cong.	14	(1909).	See	James	J.	Guinan,	Jr.,	“Duration	of	Copyright:		Study	No.	
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publisher	M.	Witmark	&	Sons	persuaded	a	divided	Supreme	Court	that	an	assignment	of	the	 renewal	 term	during	 the	 initial	 term	was	enforceable	against	 the	author.46	 In	 the	1976	Copyright	Act,	Congress	 replaced	 the	 renewal	 term	with	an	 inalienable	 right	 to	terminate	any	assignment,	grant,	or	license,	and	provided	expressly	that	an	author	was	entitled	 to	 terminate	 “notwithstanding	 any	 agreement	 to	 the	 contrary.”47	 The	 House	Report	explained	that,	 in	contrast	 to	 the	ownership	of	the	renewal	 term,	“the	right	to	take	this	action	cannot	be	waived	 in	advance	or	contracted	away.”48	 	Yet,	assignees	of	copyright	have	devised	strategies	for	undermining	the	supposed	inalienable	termination	right,	and	have	 largely	succeeded	 in	persuading	courts	of	 their	effectiveness.49	 	Thus,	
                                               30”		77-79	(1957),	reprinted	in	Copyright	Society	of	the	USA,		Studies	on	Copyright	vol.	1,	473,	495-97	(1963);	Barbara	A.	Ringer,	“Renewal	of	Copyright:		Study	No.	31”	(1960)	121-22	reprinted	in		Copyright	Society	of	the	USA,		Studies	on	Copyright		vol.	2	(1963)	503,	517-18.		46	Fred	Fisher	Music	Co.	v	M.	Witmark	&	Sons,	318	US	643	(1943).	The	majority	rejected	the	argument	that	the	statute	should	be	construed	to	preserve	the	author's	opportunity	to	renegotiate	the	terms	of	licenses	or	assignments:		 The	policy	of	the	copyright	law,	we	are	told,	is	to	protect	the	author	—	if	need	be,	from	himself	—	and	a	construction	under	which	the	author	is	powerless	to	assign	his	renewal	interest	furthers	this	policy.	We	are	asked	to	recognize	that	authors	are	congenitally	irresponsible,	that	frequently	they	are	so	sorely	pressed	for	funds	that	they	are	willing	to	sell	their	work	for	a	mere	pittance,	and	therefore	assignments	made	by	them	should	not	be	upheld..	.	.				 It	is	not	for	courts	to	judge	whether	the	interests	of	authors	clearly	lie	upon	one	side	of	this	question	rather	than	the	other.	If	an	author	cannot	make	an	effective	assignment	of	his	renewal,	it	may	be	worthless	to	him	when	he	is	most	in	need.	Nobody	would	pay	an	author	for	something	he	cannot	sell.	We	cannot	draw	a	principle	of	law	from	the	familiar	stories	of	garret-poverty	of	some	men	of	literary	genius.	Even	if	we	could	do	so,	we	cannot	say	that	such	men	would	regard	with	favour	a	rule	of	law	preventing	them	from	realizing	on	their	assets	when	they	are	most	in	need	of	funds.	.	.	.	We	conclude,	therefore,	that	the	Copyright	Act	of	1909	does	not	nullify	agreements	by	authors	to	assign	their	renewal	interests.	Ibid.	at	656-57.			47	17	USC	§	203(a)(5).	See	generally		R.	Anthony	Reese,	“Termination	Formalities	and	Notice”	(2016)		96	Boston	University		Law	Review	895;	Authors	Alliance,	Termination	of	Transfers	(2017),	at	https://www.authorsalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/20180315-ToT-Templates.pdf.		 		48	H.R.	Rep.	No.	1476,		94th	Cong.	125	(1976).		49	E.g.,	Larson	v	Warner	Brothers,		640	Fed.	Appx.	(9th	Cir.	2016);	Marvel	Characters	.	Kirby,	726	F.	3d	119		(2d	Cir.	2013);	DC	Comics	v.	Pacific	Pictures	Corp.,	545	Fed,	Appx.	678	(9th	Cir.	2013);	Penguin	Group	
(USA)	Inc.	v	Steinbeck,	537	F.3d	193,	196	(2d	Cir.	2008),	cert.	denied,	129	S.	Ct.	2383	(2009);	Milne	v	
Stephen	Slesinger,	Inc.,	430	F.3d	1036,	1039	(9th	Cir.	2005).	See,	e.g.,		Lydia	Pallas	Loren,	“Renegotiating	the	Copyright	Deal	in	the	Shadow	of	the	Inalienable	Right	to	Terminate”	(2010)	62	Fla.		
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authors'	ability	to	recapture	copyright	rights	has,	in	practice,	been	narrowly	limited.50				 Also	 in	 the	 1976	 Act,	 Congress	 narrowed	 the	 circumstances	 under	 which	 an	independent	contractor's	work	could	be	deemed	a	work	made	for	hire,	legally	authored	by	the	creator's	employer.		Under	the	current	copyright	act,	works	created	by	employees	are	works	made	for	hire.	 	Works	created	by	independent	contractors,	however,	can	be	works	made	for	hire	only	if	the	creator	signs	a	work	made	for	hire	contract.51		That	hasn't	prevented	courts	from	concluding	that	works	created	by	individuals	who	are	not	treated	as	employees	for	the	purposes	of	labour	and	tax	laws	should	nonetheless	be	deemed	to	be	 employee-created	 works	 made	 for	 hire,52	 or	 that	 works	 created	 by	 independent	contractors	who	have	not	signed	a	work	made	for	hire	agreement	should	be	considered	to	have	been	authored	by	the	entity	 that	paid	 for	 their	creation,	because	that	entity's	decision-making	authority	made	it	the	“dominant	author”	of	the	work.53			 Even	when	 the	 courts	 construe	 the	 statute	 in	authors'	 favour,	moreover,	 those	interpretations	have	little	practical	effect	on	authors'	opportunities	to	control	or	earn	money	from	their	works.	In	1993,	freelance	journalists	filed	suit	against	the	New	York	
Times,	claiming	that	the	Times'	licensing	of	their	contributions	to	electronic	and	online	databases	 infringed	 their	 reproduction,	distribution,	 and	public	display	 rights.	 	Their	
                                               Law	Review	1329;	Peter	Menell	&	David	Nimmer,	“Judicial	Resistance	to	Copyright's	Inalienable	Right	to	Terminate	Transfers”	(2010)	33	Columbia	Journal	of	Law	&	the	Arts	227.		50	Nor	do	copyright	owners	appear	to	be	willing	to	allow	the	new	or	enhanced	copyright	rights	they	are	seeking	to	be	subject	to	comparable	recapture	provisions.	Congress	is	currently	considering	the	CLASSICS	Act,	a	bill	that	would	establish	an	entitlement	to	royalties	for	the	digital	transmission	of	sound	recordings	that	were	recorded	before	US	law	extended	copyright	protection	to	sound	recordings.		See	S.	2334,	title	2,	115th	Cong.	(2018).		Although	the	bill	is	described	by	the	recording	industry	association	as	a	measure	to	“finally	ensure	that	musicians	and	vocalists	who	made	those	timeless	songs	finally	get	their	due,”	see	Recording	Industry	Association	of	America,	Press	Release:	Historic	Coalition	of	213	Musical	Artists	Calls	on	Congress	to	Pass	CLASSICS	Act,	Fix	the	"Pre-1972"	Loophole	for	Legacy	Artists	(13	Feb.	2018),	at	https://www.riaa.com/historic-coalition-213-musical-artists-calls-congress-pass-classics-act-fix-pre-1972-loophole-legacy-artists/,		it	includes	no	provisions	that	would	allow	the		original	authors	of	the	sound	recordings	to	recapture	the	ownership	of	rights	they	assigned	to	record	labels.			51	17	USC	§§	101,	201.	See	Community	for	Creative	Non	Violence	v	Reid,	490	US	730	(1989).	In	addition	to	imposing	the	requirement	of	a	signed	writing,	section	101	limits	the	category	of	commissioned	works	made	for	hire	to	nine	specific	subject	matter	categories.		See	United	States	Copyright	Office,	Circular	No.	9:		Works	Made	for	Hire	(2012),	at	https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ09.pdf.			52	See,	e.g.,	JustMed	v	Byce,	600	F.3d	1118	(9th	Cir.	2010);	JAH	IP	Holdings	v	Mascio,	2014	US	Dist	LEXIS	16246	(D.	Colo.	2014).		53	See	16	Casa	Duse	v	Merkin,	791	F.3d	247,	260	(2d	Cir.	2015).		
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initial	permission	to	the	Times	to	print	their	articles	in	its	newspaper,	they	insisted,	did	not	allow	the	Times	to	resell	those	articles	to	electronic	database	services.			The	Times	argued	that	a	privilege	 in	 the	statute	permitting	the	publisher	of	a	collective	work	to	reprint	 contributions	 to	 the	 collective	work	 only	 as	 “part	 of	 the	 collective	work,	 any	revision	 of	 that	 collective	 work,	 or	 any	 later	 collective	 work	 in	 the	 same	 series,”54	authorized	it	to	license	full	issues	of	its	newspaper	to	digital	publishers.	The	trial	court	agreed.55	In	2001,	the	United	States	Supreme	Court	concluded	that	the	purpose	of	the	statutory	 privilege	 was	 to	 protect	 authors'	 abilities	 to	 license	 their	 works	 to	 other	publishers,	while	enabling	the	publisher	of	 the	 initial	collective	work	to	print	revised	editions	without	again	securing	permission	from	every	contributor.		That	purpose	would	be	 frustrated	 if	 the	publishers	could	license	the	 individual	contributions	to	electronic	databases.56			 In	response	to	the	Supreme	Court's	ruling,	the	New	York	Times	announced	that	rather	 than	compensating	27,000	 freelance	authors	 for	 the	unauthorized	 licensing	of	their	works	to	digital	databases,	it	would	instead	permit	individual	authors	to	request	that	the	Times	continue	to	make	all	their	works	digitally	available,	without	any	additional	payment,	on	the	condition	that	the	authors	release	all	legal	claims	against	the	Times	and	its	database	licensees.		Otherwise,	the	newspaper	would	purge	all	of	those	freelancers'	contributions	 from	 its	 database.57	 	 Further,	 in	 response	 to	 the	 lawsuit,	 the	New	York	Times	and	other	large	publishers	insisted,	going	forward,	that	all	freelance	journalists	sign	work	made	 for	 hire	 or	 all	 rights	 contracts	 authorizing	 publishers	 to	 exploit	 the	
                                               54	17	USC	§	201(c).		55	Tasini	v	NY	Times,	972	F.	Supp.	804	(SDNY	2007),	rev'd	206	F.3d	161	(2d	Cir.	2000),	aff'd	533	US	483	(2001).		56	NY	Times	v	Tasini,		533	US	483,	499-506	(2001).		57	See	Felicity	Barringer,	“Freelancers	Suing	Again	on	Copyright”	New	York		Times,	July	6,	2001,	at	https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/06/business/freelancers-suing-again-on-copyright.html:		The	Times's	current	offer	to	freelancers	--	about	27,000	are	affected,	the	newspaper	estimates	--	allows	them	to	request	that	their	material	remain	available	electronically.	It	contains	a	provision	that	''should	you	opt	to	have	your	work	restored,	you	agree	that	you	will	not	be	compensated	and	that	you	will	release	The	Times	from	any	claims	relating	to	your	work	appearing	in	electronic	archives	such	as	Nexis.''		Any	request	must	cover	all	of	a	freelancer's	contributions	to	The	Times;	no	freelancers	can	pick	and	choose	how	much	of	their	work	can	remain	available.		 Ibid.		See	“Tasini	v.	The	New	York	Times:		A	Note	on	the	Consequences”	2	Complete	Review	Quarterly	#3,	August	2001,	at	http://www.complete-review.com/quarterly/vol2/issue3/tasini.htm.			 		
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works	 in	 future	 as	 well	 as	 existing	 media	 for	 no	 additional	 payment.58	 As	 Maureen	O'Rourke	 noted,	 “Although	 the	 holding	 in	 the	 case	 ostensibly	 gave	 freelancers	 a	bargaining	 chip,	 a	 lack	 of	 bargaining	 power	 precludes	 their	 obtaining	 additional	consideration	for	licensing	their	judicially	vindicated	rights.”59		 Nor	have	authors	outside	of	the	United	States	fared	significantly	better.	 	Recent	studies	of	the	effectiveness	of	copyright	law	reforms	in	the	EU	designed	to	improve	the	lot	of	 creators	 have	 concluded	 that	 the	 reforms	 enacted	 so	 far	 have	 been	 ineffective,	primarily	because	authors	lack	the	bargaining	power	to	take	advantage	of	them.60			 Too	often,	copyright	scholars'	work	neglects	questions	of	money.		Even	when	we	focus	on	authors'	compensation,	we	don't	always	pay	attention	to	whether	the	money	actually	makes	 its	way	 into	 creators'	 pockets.	 	 Recently,	we've	 been	 asking	 collecting	societies	to	do	the	hard	work	of	managing	remuneration	for	many	small-change	uses.61	We've	 learned	 that	 collecting	money	 is	 easy,	but	 figuring	out	how	to	divide	 it	 among	worthy	claimants	is	really	hard.62	The	statutory,	regulatory,	and	contractual	provisions	
                                               58	See	O'Rourke,	note	32	above,	at	pp.	605-13.		59	Ibid.	at	606.		60	See,	e.g.,		Jane	C.	Ginsburg	&	Pierre	Sirinelli,	“Private	International	Law	Aspects	of	Authors'	Contracts:		The	Dutch	and	French	Examples”	(2015)	39	Colum.	J.	L.	&	Arts	171;	Severine	Dusollier,	Caroline	Ker,	Maria	Iglesias,	&	Yolanda	Smith,	Contractual	Arrangements	Applicable	to	Creators:		Law	and	Practice	of	Selected	Member	States,	Study	Commissioned	by	the	European	Parliament	Directorate-General	for	Internal	Policies	(2014),	at	http://www.cross-innovation.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/IPOL-JURI_ET2014493041_EN.pdf;	Europe	Economics	IViR,	Remuneration	of	Authors	of	Books	and	Scientific	Journals,	Translators,	Journalists	and	Visual	Artists	for	the	Use	of	their	Works:	Study	Prepared	for	the	European	Commission			(2016),	at	https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/remuneration_of_authors_final_report.pdf.		61	 	See	Ariel	Katz,	“Copyright	Collectives:		Good	Solution	but	for	Which	Problem”	in	Rochelle	C.	Dreyfuss,	Diane	Zimmerman	&	Harry	First	(eds.),	Working	Within	the	Boundaries	of	Intellectual	Property:	
Innovation	Policy	for	the	Knowledge	Society	(2010);		see,	e.g.,	Music	Modernization	Act,		H.R.	5447,	115th	Cong.	§	102	(2018)	(establishing	a	new	music	publisher-owned	collective	to	receive	and	distribute	royalties	for	a	new	statutory	blanket	license	for	the	reproduction	of	musical	compositions	in	the	course	of	digital	streaming).	See	generally	Daniel	Gervais	(ed.),	Collective	Management	of	
Copyright	and	Related	Rights	3rd	ed.	(Frederick	2016).		62	See,	e.g.,	William	Fisher	III,	Promises	to	Keep:	Technology,	Law	&	the	Future	of	Entertainment	(Stanford,	CA	2004),		207-36;	Daniel	Gervais,	(Re)structuring	Copyright:		A	Comprehensive	Path	to	International	
Copyright	Reform	(Cheltenham	2017),	238-56;	European	Commission,	Directive	on	collective	management	of	copyright	(4	February	2014),	at	http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/management/;	European	Commission	Staff	Working	Document	Impact	Assessment	Accompanying	the	Document	Proposal	for	a	Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	on	collective	management	of	copyright	and	related	rights	and	multi-territorial	licensing	of	rights	in	musical	works	for	online	uses	in	the	internal	market	19-29	(11	July	
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that	authorize	collective	licensing	call	for	the	revenues	to	be	distributed	to	creators	and	other	rights	holders,	but	the	mechanisms	that	we	use	for	deciding	how	to	allocate	and	pay	 them	 are	 at	 best	 imperfect63	 and	 often	 deeply	 flawed.64	 Collecting	 societies	 are	themselves	intermediaries	who	will	seek	to	protect	their	own	positions	in	the	copyright	food	chain.65	We	know	that	there	are	some	collecting	entities	that	pay	at	least	a	share	of	their	receipts	directly	 to	creators.	 	There	are	others	who	pay	owners,	and	rely	on	the	owners	to	pass	the	creators'	share	on.	Others	dole	out	the	money	to	organizations	that	represent	creators	and	task	those	organizations	with	figuring	out	whether	and	how	to	distribute	the	funds	to	their	members.			Still	others	hold	the	money	in	an	interest-bearing	account	until	prospective	 claimants	 can	agree	with	each	other	on	who	 receives	what	share,	and	divide	the	money	up	according	to	their	agreement.		There	are	still	others	who	don't	disburse	the	royalties	at	all	–	they	use	the	money	to	pay	administrative	costs	and	fund	good	works.66				 Most	legal	scholars	don't	spend	much	attention	examining	this	problem,	or	trying	to	 ascertain	 what	 mechanisms	 different	 collecting	 entities	 use	 for	 deciding	 how	 to	disburse	the	money	they	collect.		It's	as	if,	once	we've	provided	that	consumers	and	users	must	buy	a	ticket	in	order	to	enjoy	a	copyrighted	work,	we're	done.		There	may	be	some	policy	justification	for	charging	fees	as	a	purely	expressive	exercise,	so	that	users	will	understand	that	enjoyment	of	a	copyrighted	work	has	commercial	value.	It's	wasteful,	in	the	sense	that	some	members	of	an	author's	audience	will	miss	encountering	the	work	because	they	can't	afford	or	don't	want	to	pay	the	ticket	price,	but	we	may	make	that	choice	nonetheless	to	send	the	message	that	enjoying	works	of	authorship	should	not	be	
                                               2012)	at	http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012SC0204&from=EN[hereinafter	Commission	Staff	Working	Document”].		63	See,	e.g.,	Litman,		note	12	above,	at	p.	50	&	n.	229.			64	See,	e.g.,	Copyright	Royalty	Board	New	Developments,	10	March	2017,	at	https://www.crb.gov/	(announcing	suspension	of	royalty	distribution	proceedings	required	by	17	USC	§	1007);	Commission	Staff	Working	Document,	note	62	above,	at	pp.	15-29.		65	See	Jonathan	Band	&	Brandon	Butler,	“Some	Cautionary	Tales	about	Collective	Licensing”	(2013)	21	Michigan	State	International		Law	Review	687;	see,	e.g.,	Molly	Long,	“Publishers	Raise	New	Concerns	Over	SGAE	Practices”	IQ	Magazine,	June	11,	2018,	at	https://www.iq-mag.net/2018/06/publishers-new-concerns-sgae-practices/#.Wx_5t1Mvw74.		66	See,	e.g.,	Hester	Wijminga	et.	al.,	World	Intellectual	Property	Association	International	Survey	on	Private	Copying:	Law	and	Practice	2016	(2017),	at	http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_1037_2017.pdf.			
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free.67		If	that's	why	we're	doing	it,	though,	we	should	say	so.		If,	on	the	other	hand,	our	purported	reason	for	levying	the	charge	is	to	put	money	into	creators'	pockets,	it	might	be	a	good	idea	to	look	to	see	how	much	of	it	actually	gets	there.		At	least	in	the	United	States,	that	question	hasn't	been	the	focus	of	much	legal	scholarship.68				 Some	 copyright	 scholars	 have	 begun	 to	 ask	 the	 question	 whether	 and	 when	creators	respond	to	the	rewards	promised	by	copyright,	and	to	try	to	harness	the	insights	of	disciplines	other	than	the	 law	–	economics,	psychology,	neurology,	history	–	 to	see	whether	it	might	be	possible	to	come	up	with	answers.69		It's	difficult,	though,	to	evaluate	whether	 the	 answers	 to	 that	 question	 have	 real-world	 significance	without	 knowing	whether	and	under	what	circumstances	creators	will	actually	collect	those	rewards.		 If	I'm	right	that	most	of	us	have	given	up	on	close	scrutiny	of	author	compensation	because	we	suspect	that	it's	a	hopeless	inquiry,	this	may	be	a	good	time	to	re-examine	that	impulse.		That,	however,	would	require	us	to	confront	the	questions	we	no	longer	ask	and	the	features	of	the	copyright	system	that	we	seldom	notice,	because	we've	grown	
                                               67	Cf.	Jane	C.	Ginsburg,	“Fair	Use	for	Free,	or	Permitted-but-Paid?”	(2015)	29	Berkeley	Technology	Law	Journal	1383.		68	But	see	Peter	DiCola,	“Money	From	Music:		Survey	Evidence	on	Musicians'	Revenue	and	Lessons	About	Copyright	Incentives”	(2013)	55	Arizona		Law	Review	301.		There	are	a	number	of	recent	economic	and	legal	studies	from	Europe,	with	discouraging	conclusions.		See,	e.g.,	Martin	Kretschmer,	“Copyright	and	Contracts:		Regulating	Creator	Contracts:		The	State	of	the	Art	and	a	Research	Agenda”	(2010)	18	Journal	of	Intellectual	Property	Law	141;		Ruth	Towse,	“Economics	of	Copyright	Collecting	Societies	and	Digital	Rights:		Is	there	a	Case	for	a	Centralised	Digital	Copyright	Exchange?”	(2012)	9	Review	of	Economic	Research	on	Copyright	Issues	3;	Christian	Handke	&	Ruth	Towse,	“Economics	of	Copyright	Collecting	Societies”	(2007)	38	International		Review	of	Intellectual	Property	&	Competition	Law	937;	Ruth	Towse,	“Copyright	and	Artists:	A	View	From	Cultural	Economics”	(2006)	20	Journal		Economic	Surveys	567;	Europe	Economics	IViR,	note	60	above;		Martin	Kretschmer,	Private	Copying	and		Fair	Compensation:		An	Empirical	Study	of	Copyright	Levies	in	Europe	(2011),	at	https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310183/ipresearch-faircomp-201110.pdf.		69	E.g.,		Glynn	Lunney,	Copyright’s	Excess:		Money	and	Music	in	the	US	Recording	Industry	(Cambridge	2018);	Christopher	Sprigman,	“Copyright	and	Creative	Incentives:		What	We	Know	(and	Don't)”	(2017)	55	Houston		Law	Review	451;	Rebecca	Tushnet,		“Economies	of	Desire:		Fair	Use	and	Marketplace	Assumptions”	(2009)	51	William	&	Mary		Law	Review	513;	Diane	Zimmerman,	“Copyright	As	Incentives:		Did	We	Just	Imagine	That?”	(2010)	12	Theoretical	Inquiries	in	Law	29;	Martin	Senftleben,	“Copyright,	Creators,	&	Society's	Need	for	Autonomous	Art	–	The	Blessing	and	Curse	of	Monetary	Incentives”	(2017)		in		Giblin	&	Weatherall,	note	11	above,	at	p.	25.	See	also	CREATe	Copyright	Research	Centre	at	the	University	of	Glasgow,	Copyright	Evidence	Wiki,	at	http://www.copyrightevidence.org/evidence-wiki/index.php/Copyright_Evidence	(cataloguing	empirical	studies).	
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inured	to	the	ways	that	the	copyright	system	fails	to	deliver	on	the	promises	of	copyright	theory.		 II.			COPYRIGHT	AND	PROPERTY		In	the	rest	of	this	Essay,	I'll	argue	that	one	reason	we	talk	less	than	we	should	about	how	the	copyright	system	commonly	fails	to	reward	creators	is	that	our	assumptions	about	legal	 property	 rights	 distort	 our	 perceptions	 of	 the	way	 the	 copyright	 laws	 operate.		Copyright	experts	take	a	lot	for	granted	about	the	way	the	copyright	system	works	and	is	 supposed	 to	 work.	 	 Copyright	 is	 a	 property	 right.	 	 We're	 lawyers.	 	 The	 legal	characteristics	of	property	rights	are	basic	building	blocks	of	our	legal	education.					 One	 element	 of	 legal	 property	 rights	 is	 control,	 and	most	 of	 the	 debates	 over	treating	 copyright	as	a	 form	of	property	have	 focused	on	 the	 control	 that	 a	property	owner	is	able	or	should	be	able	to	exercise.70		Control	is	an	important	aspect	of	property,	but	it	isn't	the	only	or	even	the	most	important	aspect.		After	all,	we	have	lots	of	different	ways	to	give	an	individual	legal	control	over	something	without	giving	her	a	property	right.				 What	 makes	 property	 rights	 special	 is	 that	 they	 are	 alienable.71	 	 Treating	something	as	property	makes	it	easier	to	sell.		We	define	a	right	as	a	property	right	to	encourage	 its	 transfer.72	 	This	 intrinsic	 feature	of	 legal	property	 is	something	that	 it's	easy	for	lawyers	to	take	for	granted.	What	makes	it	possible	for	publishers,	record	labels,	and	other	intermediaries	to	behave	the	way	they've	been	behaving	is	that	the	powers	conferred	by	a	copyright	belong	to	the	copyright	owner	rather	than	the	author.73	That	strikes	non-lawyers	as	odd,	but	it's	second	nature	to	us.		Our	copyright	system	empowers	publishers	and	record	labels	to	structure	licensing	deals	for	their	own	benefit,	since	they	
                                               70	See,	e.g.,	Lawrence	Lessig,	Free	Culture	(New	York	2004),	83-173;	Patry,	note	11	above,	at	pp.	109-132;	Sandra	Aistars,	Devin	Hartline,	&	Mark	Schultz,	“Copyright	Principles	and	Priorities	to	Foster	a	Creative	Digital	Marketplace”	(2016)	23	George	Mason		Law	Review	769;	Michael	Grynberg,	“Property	is	a	Two-Way	Street:		Personal	Copyright	Use	and	Implied	Authorization”	(2010)	79	Fordham		Law	Review	435;	Robert	P.	Merges,	“The	Concept	of	Property	in	the	Digital	Era”	(2008)	45	Houston		Law	Review	1239;	Adam	Mossoff,	“Is	Copyright	Property?”	(2005)	42	San	Diego	Law	Review	29.		71	Accord,	Ginsburg,	note	10	above,	at	pp.	66-67.		72	See,	e.g.,	Jessica	Litman,	“Information	Privacy/Information	Property”	(2000)	52	Stanford		Law	Review		1283,	1295-1301.		73	See,	e.g.,	Fisher,	note	62	above,	at	pp.	47-70,	204-05;	Bently,	note	41	above,	at	pp.	15-21;		Kretschmer,	note	31	above,	at	pp.	32-33.		
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own	the	copyrights,	and	set	the	terms	and	conditions	for	copyright	licenses.		 Because	we're	lawyers,	we	know	that	the	grantee	of	a	property	right	stands	in	the	shoes	of	 the	grantor	and	 is	entitled	to	exercise	the	powers	embodied	 in	the	property	right.		We	assume	that	the	original	property	owner	has	had	the	opportunity	to	extract	compensation	for	the	value	of	the	right,	because	that's	just	how	property	rights	work.		Indeed,	 copyright	 lawyers	 and	 scholars	 sometimes	 use	 the	 words	 “author”	 and	“copyright	owner”	interchangeably,	treating	them	as	synonyms.74		After	all,	the	author	is	the	initial	copyright	owner,	and	the	person	to	whom	she	transfers	those	rights	is	entitled	to	step	into	her	shoes.		For	most	purposes,	in	the	eyes	of	the	law,	the	owner	is	the	author.75		 We	 could	 take	 a	 more	 nuanced	 look	 at	 how	 legal	 copyright	 property	 rights	actually	behave	in	the	world.		We	should	examine	our	view	of	legal	property	to	identify	the	things	that	our	assumptions	may	prevent	us	from	seeing.		 III.				THE	DAWES	ACT	AND	THE	STATUTE	OF	ANNE		I'm	going	to	take	a	short	detour	to	tell	a	story	that,	at	least	at	first,	isn't	going	to	seem	as	if	it	has	any	bearing	on	copyright	law.	It	begins	about	400	years	ago.		In	the	16th	and	17th	centuries,	European	colonists	sailed	to	North	America	to	develop	new	territories	in	the	names	of	their	sovereigns.76				 Unfortunately,	the	new	land	already	had	occupants	who	had	lived	on	that	land	for	centuries.		The	European	settlers	moved	in	anyway.			Sometimes,	it	was	possible	for	the	Europeans	 and	 the	 indigenous	 tribes	 to	 coexist,	 at	 least	 initially;	 in	 other	 situations,	though,	 the	 indigenous	 Indian	 tribes	 occupied	 area	 that	 the	 Europeans	 wanted	 to	control.77	 	 The	 Indians	weren't	 white,	 weren't	 Christian,	 and	weren't	 farmers.	 	 They	
                                               74	See,	e.g.,	Jane	C	Ginsburg,	“Copyright	Use	and	Excuse	on	the	Internet”	(2000)	24	Columbia-VLA	Journal	of	Law	&	the	Arts	1,	41;	Ralph	Oman,	“Going	Back	to	First	Principles:		The	Exclusive	Rights	of	Authors	Reborn”	(2008)	8	Journal	of	High	Technology	Law	169,	176-77,	180.	75	See,	e.g.,	Bhamati	Viswanathan	&	Adam	Mossoff,	Open-Access	Mandates	and	the	Seductively	False	Promise	of	“Free”,	Center	for	the	Protection	of	Intellectual	Property	Briefing	Paper	4	(April	2017),	at	http://apo.org.au/node/93506.		Moral	rights,	of	course,	are	an	important	exception	to	this	rule.		Even	in	countries	with	robust	moral	rights	protection,	however,	those	rights	appear	to	have	negligible	economic	value	and	restrain	the	exploitation	of	copyrighted	works	only	in	extreme	cases.		76	See	generally	Robert	T.	Anderson,	Bethany	Berger,	Sarah	Krakoff	&	Philip	E.	Frickey,		American	Indian	
Law:		Cases	and	Commentary	3rd	ed.		(St.	Paul	2015),	22-25.		77	See	generally,	e.g.,	Nell	Jessup	Newton,	(ed.),	Cohen's	Handbook	of	Federal	Indian	Law:		2005	edition		(Newark	2005).		
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weren't	 using	 the	 land	 for	what	 the	 Europeans	 believed	 to	 be	 the	 best	 and	 highest	purpose.78		Some	of	the	European	settlements	felt	little	compunction	about	seizing	the	land	from	its	occupants.		Violence	ensued.79					 Eventually,	after	enough	people	had	been	killed	and	enough	property	had	been	damaged,	the	settlements	and	the	tribes	reached	agreements,	dividing	up	the	disputed	territory	between	them.80	 	Those	agreements,	though,	turned	out	to	be	unstable.	 	The	European-Americans	kept	 seeking	to	expand	 their	 territory.	 	Over	 the	next	200	or	so	years,	 they	 used	 money,	 persuasion,	 threats,	 citizen	 violence,	 and	 military	 force	 to	convince	or	compel	Indian	tribes	to	relocate	westward	to	more	remote	and	less	desirable	land.81	 	 Along	 the	 way,	 more	 violence	 ensued.82	 	 	 The	 American	 army	 was	 busy	conducting	one	or	another	war	with	Indian	tribes	for	most	of	the	19th	century.83		 American	courts	concluded	that	Indians	had	an	enforceable	legal	right	to	occupy	tribal	land,	but	that	they	didn't	actually	own	it.84		The	United	States	federal	government	
                                               	78	See	ibid.;	Eric	Kades,	“The	Dark	Side	of	Efficiency:		Johnson	v.	M'Intosh	and	the	Expropriation	of	American	Indian	Lands”	(2000)	148	U.	Penn.		Law	Review	1065,	1076-77.		79	See	Bethany	Berger,	“Red:	Racism	and	the	American	Indian”	(2009)	56	UCLA		Law	Review	591,	603-07.		See,	e.g.,	Ethan	A	Schmidt,	The	Divided	Dominion:		Social	Conflict	and	Indian	Hatred	in	Early	
Virginia	(2014),	45-61	(Anglo-Powhatan	wars	between	English	settlers	in	the	Virginia	Colony	and	the	Powhatan	tribe);		Stephen	Feeley,	“’Before	Long	to	be	Good	Friends:’		Diplomatic	Perspectives	of	the	Tuscarora	War”		in		Michelle	LeMaster	&	Bradford	J.	Wood	(eds.),	Creating	and	Contesting	Carolina	(Columbia	2013),	140	(Tuscarora	war	between	Tuscarora	tribe	and	British,	German	and	Dutch	settlers	in	North	Carolina);	Evan	Haefeli,	“Kieft's	War	and	the	Cultures	of	Violence	in	Colonial	America”	in		Michael	A.	Bellesiles,	(ed.),	Lethal	Imagination:		Violence	and	Brutality	in	American	
History			(New	York	1999),	17	(war	between	Dutch	settlers	in	the	New	Netherland	colony	and	the	Lenape	tribe).		80	See	Stuart	Banner,	How	the	Indians	Lost	their	Land	(2005),	85-111.		81	See,	e.g.,	Anderson	et.	al,	note	76	above,	at	p.	50;	Banner,	note	80	above,	at	pp.	191-227.		82	See,	e.g.,		Banner,	note	80	above,		at	pp.	121-29;	Newton,	note	77	above,	at	pp.	35-36,	39-40,	44;	Angie	Deboe,	A	History	of	the	Indians	of	the	United	States	(Norman,	OK	1970)	101-16;	Angie	Deboe,	The	
Road	to	Disappearance:		A	History	of	the	Creek	Indians	(Norman,	OK	1966)	72-107.		83	See	Banner,	note	80	above,	at	pp.	237-47;	see,	e.g.,	Newton,	note	77	above,	at	pp.	51-54,	71;	E.A.	Schwartz,	The	Rogue	River	Indian	War	and	Its	Aftermath:		1859-1980	(1997)	69-160.		84	E.g.,	Johnson's	Lessee	v	M'Intosh,	21	US	543	(1923);	see	Banner,	note	80	above,	at	pp.	150-90;	Lindsay	G.	Robinson,	“The	Judicial	Conquest	of	Native	America:		The	Story	of	Johnson	v.	M'Intosh”	in	Carole	Goldberg,	Kevin	K.	Washburn	&	Philip	P.	Frickey	(eds.),	Indian	Law	Stories	(New	York	2011),		29.	
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came	under	immense	pressure	to	open	Indian	land	for	settlement	by	white	European-Americans.85		It	tried	to	use	the	tools	at	its	disposal	(money	and	soldiers)	to	move	the	tribes	out	of	the	way	of	white	homesteaders.		Indian	tribes	who	had	agreed	to	resettle	west	of	the	Mississippi	river,	only	to	be	asked	to	move	again,	were	increasingly	reluctant	to	consent	to	be	uprooted.86	Besides,	the	government	was	running	out	of	surplus	land.87	Yet	more	violence	followed.88		 White	Americans	resented	the	tribes'	control	of	land	that	they	believed	should	by	rights	be	available	to	them.	They	pursued	a	variety	of	devices,	many	of	them	unlawful,	to	wrest	control	of	the	land	from	the	tribes.89		 What	ended	up	doing	the	trick	was	a	series	of	statutes	of	which	the	most	famous	was	the	Dawes	Act,	also	known	as	the	General	Allotment	Act	of	1887.90		Instead	of	taking	the	land	away	from	the	tribes,	the	Dawes	Act	gave	title	to	the	tribal	land	to	individual	Indians.	The	Act	divided	the	vast	tracts	of	territory	controlled	by	Indian	tribes	into	many	160-acre	plots,	and	awarded	each	plot	to	an	individual	Indian	head	of	household,	in	trust	for	a	short	period	and	then	in	fee	simple.	 	During	the	trust	period,	the	Indian	owners	were	permitted	to	lease	the	plot	to	white	Americans.		After	the	trust	period	expired,	the	Indian	household	that	owned	the	land	was	free	to	sell	it	to	any	buyer.		Any	unallocated	plots	were	deemed	 “surplus	 land,”	 and	were	purchased	 from	 the	 tribe	by	 the	 federal	government	and	made	available	for	sale	to	non-Indians.			At	the	time,	I'm	sure	that	some	of	the	supporters	of	the	law	believed	it	would	empower	individual	Indians	to	vest	them	with	ownership	of	a	plot	of	land;	other	supporters,	though,	had	more	cynical	motives.		In	any	event,	to	the	extent	that	one	purpose	of	the	statutes	was	to	encourage	the	transfer	of	
                                               	85	See	Banner,	note	80	above,		at	pp.	195-226.		86	See	ibid.	at	pp.	197-201,	212-17,	222-26;	Newton,	note	77	above,	at	pp.	51-54,	73.		87	See	Banner,	note	80	above,		at	228-36.		88	See,	e.g.,		Anderson	et.	al,		note	76	above,		at	pp.	74-77;	Newton,	note	77	above,	at	pp.	70-71,	73.		89	See	Banner,	note	80	above,		at	pp.		214-27,	237-45.	90			General	Allotment	Act	of	Feb.	8,	1887,		24	Stat.	388,	ch.	119.	See	also	Act	for	the	Protection	of	the	People	of	Indian	Territory,		Pub.	L.	55-515,	30	Stat.	495	(1898)	(“Curtis	Act”);		Dawes	Act	Amendment	of	1891,	26	Stat.	794	(1891);	General	Allotment	Act	Amendment	of	1906,	Pub.	L.	59-149,	34	Stat.	182	(1906)	(“Burke	Act”);	Act	Authorizing	the	Secretary	of	the	Interior	to	Allot	homesteads	to	the	Natives	of	Alaska,		Pub.	L.	59-171,	34	Stat.	197	(1906).	For	historical	background	on	the	allotment	policy	and	a	brief	description	of	initial	allotment	efforts	preceding	the	Dawes	Act,	see	generally		Newton,	note	77	above,	at	66-69,	75-78.		
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land	 from	 Indian	 tribes	 to	white	 American	 citizens,	 it	 was	 a	 stunning	 success.	 	 Very	quickly,	the	majority	of	the	land	occupied	by	Indian	tribes	passed	out	of	Indian	hands	through	sales	to	non-Indians.	The	winners	were	white	settlers	and	land	speculators;	the	Indians	ended	up	both	impoverished	and	often	displaced.91				 I	want	 to	draw	a	couple	of	parallels	 from	that	story	to	a	statute	that	copyright	lawyers	are	more	familiar	with.		This	story	starts	at	about	the	same	time.		In	the	16th	and	17th	centuries,	the	members	of	the	Stationers'	Company	had	a	monopoly	on	publishing,	augmented	by	a	naked	horizontal	restraint	of	trade	among	the	members.92	After	more	than	a	century	controlling	the	business	of	publishing,	the	Stationers	surely	felt	entitled	to	continue	to	exercise	that	control.		They	had,	after	all,	invested	significant	money	and	efforts	 into	printing	and	selling	their	 texts.	When	Parliament	declined	to	re-enact	 the	licensing	act	that	gave	the	members	of	the	Stationers	company	their	printing	monopoly,	the	Stationers	engaged	in	strenuous	lobbying	to	persuade	the	government	to	restore	it.93				 I	don't	want	to	simplify	the	complex	set	of	considerations	that	went	into	enacting	the	 Statute	 of	 Anne,94	 or	 to	 minimize	 the	 provisions	 included	 for	 the	 protection	 of	universities,	readers	and	consumers,95	or	to	suggest	that	some	of	the	law's	supporters	
                                               91	Banner,	note	80	above,	at	pp.	257-93;	see	Judith	V.	Royster,	“The	Legacy	of	Allotment”	(1995)	27	Ariz.	St.	L.	J.	1,	10-14.	In	1934,	Congress	repudiated	the	allotment	program.	The	Indian	Reorganization	Act	of	1934	prohibited	further	allotment	of	Indian	land	and	sought	to	return	to	the	Tribes	some	portion	of	the	90	million	acres	of	Indian	land	that	had	passed	into	non-Indian	ownership.		Indian	Reorganization	Act,	Pub.	L.	No.	73-383,	48	Stat.	984	(1934)	(codified	as	amended	at	25	U.S.C.	§§	461-479	(1976).		See	Blackfeet	Tribe	of	Indians	v	State	of	Montana,	729	F.2d	1192	(9th	Cir.	1984)	(en	banc),	aff'd	471	US	759	(1985).	92	See,	e.g.,	L.	Ray	Patterson,	Copyright	in	Historical	Perspective	(Nashville	1968),	28-77;	Ian	Gadd,	“The	Stationers	Company	in	England	Before	1710”	in	Isabella	Alexander	&	H.	Tomas	Gomez-Arostegui	(eds.),		Research	Handbook	on	the	History	of	Copyright	Law	(Cheltenham	2018),	81,	88-92.			93	See		Cyprian	Blagden,	The	Stationers	Company:		A	History	1403-1959		(London	1960),	153-77;	Ronan	Deazley,	On	the	Origin	of	the	Right	to	Copy	(Oxford	2004),	1-50;		Isabella	Alexander,	“All	Change	for	the	Digital	Economy:		Copyright	and	Business	Models	in	the	Early	Eighteenth	Century”	(2010)	25	Berkeley	Technology	Law	Journal	1351;	Gadd,	note	92	above,	at	pp.	92-95.		94	Statute	of	Anne,	8.	Anne,	c.	19	(1710).		See,	e.g.,	Deazley,		note	93	above,	at	pp.	31-50;		Alexander,	note	93		above,	at	pp.	1354-62;	H.	Tomas	Gomez-Arostegui,	“The	Untold	Story	of	the	First	Copyright	Suit	under	the	Statute	of	Anne	in	1710”	(2010)	25	Berkeley	Technology	Law	Journal	1247,		1251-58;	Jessica	Litman,	“Readers	Copyright”	(2011)	58	Journal	of	the		Copyright	Society	of	the	USA	325,	332-35.		95	 	See	Ariel	Katz,	“Copyright,	Exhaustion,	and	the	Role	of	Libraries	in	the	Ecosystem	of	Knowledge”	(2016)	13	I/S	Journal	of	Law	&	Policy	for	the	Information	Society		81,	84-86;	Litman,	note	94	above,	
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didn't	believe	that	it	would	empower	authors.		Whatever	the	intention,	the	law	ended	up	working	out	pretty	well	for	the	members	of	the	Stationers'	company.		By	establishing	an	assignable	property	right	for	authors	and	their	assigns,	the	law	encouraged	authors	to	convey	their	copyrights	to	printers	and	publishers	(who,	after	all,	were	the	folks	with	the	printing	presses),	where	they	have	stayed	pretty	much	for	the	next	300	years.96			 The	rest	of	 the	world	 followed	that	model.97	 	 In	almost	every	country,	authors	receive	copyright	protection	as	an	initial	matter,	but	those	copyrights	are	transferred	to	and	then	owned	and	controlled	by	publishers	and	other	intermediaries.98	In	the	United	States,	where	capitalism	is	both	our	economic	system	and	our	dominant	religion,	courts	were	 especially	 eager	 to	 conclude	 that	 authors	 had	 conveyed	 their	 copyrights	 to	publishers,	 even	 in	 the	absence	of	 any	evidence,	 and	 that	 inclination	has	persisted.99		When	 it	didn't	work	 to	simply	presume	 that	 the	 copyright	had	been	 transferred,	our	courts	invented	the	work	made	for	hire	doctrine	out	of	whole	cloth.100				 The	moral	of	both	of	 these	stories	 is	 that	deeming	a	resource	to	be	a	property	right	is	often	an	extremely	effective	way	to	gain	control	of	that	resource,	especially	when	you	don't	have	control	of	it	at	the	outset.		When	the	law	transforms	something	that	was	not	 formerly	property	 into	a	property	 right,	 the	accompanying	alienability	will	 cause	control	of	it	to	flow	to	those	with	the	most	bargaining	power.	If	you	are	looking	to	get	your	hands	on	some	arable	land	or	to	regain	your	control	of	the	printing	of	texts,	creating	new	 property	 rights	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 an	 excellent	 strategy.	 	 Sometimes	 the	 original	recipient	of	the	property	benefits,	but	not	always.		Sometimes	the	world	improves	as	a	result;	other	times	it	doesn't.			
                                               at	pp.	333-35.		96	 	See	Patterson,	note	92	above,	at	pp.	143-50,	213-21.		97	 	See,	e.g.,	Oren	Bracha,	“The	Adventures	of	the	Statute	of	Anne	in	the	Land	of	Unlimited	Possibilities:	The	Life	of	a	Legal	Transplant”	(2010)	25	Berkeley	Technology	Law	Journal	1427.		98	 	See	Jane	C.	Ginsburg	&	Edouard	Treppoz,	International	Copyright	Law	US	and	EU	Perspectives:		Text	
and	Cases	(Cheltenham	2015);		Paul	Goldstein	&	Bernt	Hugenholz,	International	Copyright	2nd	ed.		(Oxford	2010),	244-69;	Ginsburg,	note	10	above,	at	pp.	63-66.	99	 	See	Litman,	note	44	above,	at	pp.	732-34;	see,	e.g.,	Bleistein	v	Donaldson	Lithographing	Co.,	188	U.S.	239,	248-49	(1903);	Edward	Thompson	Co.	.	Am.	Law	Book	Co.,	119	F.	217,	219	(C.C.S.D.N.Y.	1902);	
Colliery	Eng’r	Co.	v	United	Correspondence	Schs.,	94	F.	152,	153	(C.C.S.D.N.Y.	1899).		100		See	Catherine	Fisk,	“Authors	at	Work:		The	Origins	of	the	Work-for-Hire	Doctrine”	(2003)	15	Yale	J.	L	&	Humanities	1.		
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IV.				THE	WAGES	OF	PROPERTY	RIGHTS		So,	 here's	 the	upshot:	 	 Immense	 sums	 of	money	 slosh	 through	 the	 current	 copyright	system,	 but	 only	 a	 tiny	 share	 of	 that	money	 ends	 up	 in	 authors'	 pockets.	 	 By	 some	accounts,	that	share	has	been	decreasing.	We	all	know	that,	because,	as	I	said,	we	live	in	the	world	and	see	the	evidence	all	around	us,	but	we	have	tended	to	overlook	it	when	we	talk	about	copyright	law	reform.	Over	the	past	300	years,	we've	expanded	and	extended	copyright	 repeatedly,	 and	 larded	 the	 law	 up	 with	 new	 licenses	 and	 payment	obligations.101			We've	failed,	however,	to	pay	enough	attention	to	how	–	or	whether	–	the	intermediaries	tasked	with	distributing	the	revenues	actually	disburse	them.		We	don't	look	 inside	the	black	box	surrounding	the	author's	conveyance	of	her	rights	to	a	new	owner.		Because	we	understand	how	property	rights	work,	we	trust	and	assume	that	the	profits	flowing	from	copyright	expansion	redound	to	the	benefit	of	authors.			 But,	because	we	live	in	the	world,	we	know,	or	should	know,	that	often	they	don't.	If	we	believe	that	that's	a	problem	(and	I	happen	to),	we	won't	be	able	to	figure	out	how	to	fix	it	without	a	careful	examination	of	what	is	inside	the	black	box.	That	means	asking	some	questions	that	we	aren’t	in	the	habit	of	asking,	and	that	copyright	owners	are	not	in	the	habit	of	answering.102			 (Let	me	say,	parenthetically,	that	if	we	decide	that	it	isn't	a	problem	that	authors	receive	so	small	a	share	of	the	proceeds	from	their	works,	the	fuss	about	the	so	called	“value	gap”	makes	even	less	sense.	If	we	believe	that	economics	and	policy	support	the	conclusion	 that	 authors'	 	 teeny-weeny	 percentage	 of	 the	 vast	 sums	 generated	 by	 the	enjoyment	of	works	of	entertainment	and	information	is	the	right	amount	to	pay	them,	it's	hard	to	see	any	 justification	 for	 interfering	 in	 the	negotiations	among	commercial	distributors	 to	 dictate	 which	 of	 them	 gets	 the	 largest	 share	 of	 the	 very	 substantial	remainder.)		 If	the	problem	is	worth	addressing,	though,	we	should	have	learned	by	now	that	it	isn't	a	useful	solution	to	throw	more	money	and	control	at	copyright	owners	and	trust	that,	this	time,	they	will	share	a	larger	part	of	it	with	authors.				 I	want	to	emphasize	the	narrow	limits	of	the	argument	that	I'm	making.		I'm	not	arguing	that	the	alienability	of	copyrights	is	itself	the	problem,	nor	that	I	believe	that	we	could	solve	it	simply	by	limiting	copyright	transfers	or	making	rights	inalienable.		After	
                                               101		See,	e.g.,	Neil	Weinstock	Netanel,	Copyright's	Paradox	(Oxford	2008),	54-80.		102			I	don't	mean	to	minimize	the	practical	difficulties	posed	by	intermediaries'	insistence	that	contract	terms	and	payments	are	proprietary	information	that	they	are	entitled	to	keep	secret.		See,	e.g.,	Peter	DiCola	&	David	Touve,	“Licensing	in	the	Shadow	of	Copyright”	(2014)	17	Stanford	Technology		Law	Review	397,	443-57.		
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all,	consider	Germany.		Germany	treats	copyrights	as	inalienable,	at	least	formally,103	but	German	authors	don't	appear	to	enjoy	significant	financial	advantages	over	authors	from	other	countries.104	 	I	think	the	role	that	the	alienability	of	property	rights	plays	in	my	argument	 is	 twofold.	 	 First,	 whenever	 we	 have	 significant	 disparities	 in	 wealth	 and	bargaining	power,	the	distribution	of	freely	alienable	property	rights	is	almost	always	going	to	mirror	and	will	 often	exacerbate	 those	disparities.	 	 Second,	 the	 legal	dogma	surrounding	property	rights,	which,	as	lawyers,	we've	inhaled	since	we	were	students,	can	keep	us	from	appreciating	those	disparities.	We	don't	pay	enough	attention	to	the	use	 of	 alienable	 property	 rights	 as	 a	 device	 to	 allow	 powerful	 actors	 to	 appropriate	valuable	items	in	the	control	of	less	powerful	actors.	
	 V.				SEEING	WHAT	WE	DON'T	SEE	
	
	Is	the	problem	indeed	as	intractable	at	it	sometimes	seems,	or	is	there	something	we	could	do	to	address	it?		 Copyright	in	the	21st	century	is	a	byzantine	legal	ecosystem.	I	believe	that	there	would	be	real	value	 in	our	exploring	that	ecosystem,	carefully	and	from	the	 inside,	 in	order	to	understand	the	reasons	that	it	has	persistently	given	creators	short	shrift.	That	would	 involve	 our	 taking	 a	 painstaking	 look	 at	 the	 way	 that	 authors	 and	 copyright	owners	structure	their	 interactions,	 to	 figure	out	where,	 if	anywhere,	 an	 intervention	might	be	effective.		 I	don't	have	an	easy	solution	to	propose.	It's	possible,	but	unlikely,	that	we	could	tweak	copyright	ownership	law	or	revise	copyright	 licensing	rules	in	ways	that	could	significantly	improve	the	world	for	at	least	some	authors.105		Throwing	more	copyright	
                                               103			See	German	Copyright	Act	§§	29,	31.			104			See,	e.g.,	Martin	Kretschmer	&		Philip	Hardwick,	Authors'	Earnings	from	Copyright	and	Non-Copyright	Sources:		A	Survey	of	25,000	British	and	German	Writers	(2007);	Kretschmer,	note	31	above,	at	pp.	12-15;	Sentfleben,	note	69	above,	at	p.	53.	See	also,	e.g.,		Ginsburg	&		Sirinelli,		note	60	above	(examining	private	international	law	obstacles	to	implementing	author-protective	legislation	enacted	in	France	and	the	Netherlands).		105			See,	e.g.,	Julie	E.	Cohen	Configuring	the	Networked	Self	(New	Haven	2012),	223-66;	Gervais,	note	62	above,	at	pp.	191-215;	William	Patry,	How	to	Fix	Copyright	(Oxford	2011),	177-88;	Jessica	Silbey,	The	
Eureka	Myth:		Creators,	Innovators	and	Everyday	Intellectual	Property	(Stanford	2015)	274-85;	Loren,	note	49	above;	R.	Anthony	Reese,	“Optional	Copyright	Renewal:		Lessons	for	Designing	Copyright	Systems,	The	38	Annual	Horace	J.	Manges	Lecture”	(2015)	39	Columbia	Journal	of	Law	&	the	Arts	145;	Molly	Van	Houweling,	“Making	Copyright	Work	for	Authors	Who	Write	to	Be	Read”	(2015)	38	Columbia	Journal	of	Law	&	the	Arts	381.	
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rights	at	copyright	owners106	is	unlikely	to	trickle	down	to	creators	–	at	least	unless	and	until	we	understand	more	of	the	dynamic	that	results	in	their	getting	such	a	small	share	of	the	proceeds	from	their	creations.		Adjusting	the	law	to	enhance	the	bargaining	power	of	publishers	over	platforms	or	platforms	over	publishers107		isn't	calculated	to	make	life	better	for	creators.		I	don't	see	much	promise	in	any	of	the	pending	statutory	or	treaty	proposals	currently	on	the	table.	It	may	be	that	those	proposals	are	the	only	proposals	that	 have	 any	 practical	 chance	 of	 adoption,	 precisely	 because	Reed	Elsevier,	 Vivendi,	Disney,	or	Google	won't	countenance	any	new	law	or	treaty	that	leaves	them	no	better	off	than	the	current	law.		Copyright	intermediaries	have	enough	political	power	to	insist	on	watering	down	reform	proposals	until	they	will	be	of	little	actual	use	to	creators,	and	have	 recently	 exercised	 that	 power	 to	 revise	 legislative	 and	 treaty	 proposals	 in	 their	favour.108		Over	the	past	twenty	years,	we've	seen	several	unsuccessful	efforts	to	reform	national	 and	 international	 copyright	 law-making	 processes	 to	 weaken	 the	 influence	wielded	 by	 powerful	 copyright	 players.109	 Such	 efforts	 face	 obstacles	 that	 seem	insurmountable.	 	 	 	The	 firm	hold	 that	 copyright	 intermediaries	have	on	national	 and	international	law-making	processes,	and	their	current	preoccupation	with	marshalling	all	 available	 resources	 to	vanquish	each	other,	suggest	 that	 realistic	opportunities	 for	
                                               106		See,	e.g.,	H.R.	1836,	Fair	Play	Fair	Pay	Act,	115th	Cong.	(2017)	(giving	sound	recording	copyright	owners	new	exclusive	right	to	perform	their	sound	recordings	over	AM	and	FM	radio);	Christophe	Geiger,	Oleksandr	Bulayenko,	&	Giancarlo	Frosio,	“The	Introduction	of	a	Neighbouring	Right	for	Press	Publishers	at	EU	Level:		The	Unneeded	(and	Unwanted)	Reform”	(2017)	39	EIPR	202.		107		See,	e.g.,	Joint	Comments	of	Amer.	Ass'n	of	Independent	Music	et.	al.,	U.S.	Copyright	Office:	In	re	Section	512	Study,	Docket	No.	2015-7	(31	March	2016),	at	https://www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Music-Community-Submission-in-re-DMCA-512-FINAL-7559445.pdf;			Judy	Chu	&	Tom	Marino,	Victims	of	IP	Theft	Need	Better	Protection,	The	Hill,	March	12,	2014,	at	http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/200630-victims-of-ip-theft-need-better-protection;	Jonathan	Taplin,	“Is	it	Time	to	Break	Up	Google?”	New	York	Times,	22	April	2017,	at	https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/22/opinion/sunday/is-it-time-to-break-up-google.html;	Stephen	Carlisle,		DMCA	“Takedown”	Notices:		Why	“Takedown”	Should	Become	“Takedown	and	Stay	Down”	and	Why	It's	Good	for	Everyone,	Nova	Southeastern	University	Copyright	Office		Blog,	23	July		2014,	at	http://copyright.nova.edu/dmca-takedown-notices/;		Elliot	Harmon,	“Notice	and	Stay	Down”	is	Really	Filter	Everything,	Electronic	Frontier	Foundation	Deeplinks	Blog,	21	Jan.	2016,	at	https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/01/notice-and-stay-down-really-filter-everything.		108		See,	e.g.,	Rebecca	Giblin,	“Should	It	Be	Copyright's	Role	to	Fill	Houses	with	Books?”		in	Susy	Frankel	&	Daniel	Gervais	(eds.)	Intellectual	Property	and	Regulation	of	the	Internet:	The	Nexus	with	Human	
and	Economic	Development	(Wellington,	NZ		2017);	Margot	E.	Kaminski,	“The	Capture	of	International	Intellectual	Property	Through	the	US	Trade	Regime”	(2014)		87	S.	Cal.		Law	Review	977.	109		See,	e.g.,	Gaelle	Krikorian	&	Amy	Kapczynski	(eds.),	Access	to	Knowledge	in	the	Age	of	Intellectual	
Property	(New	York	2010);	Lawrence	Lessig,	Republic,	Lost:		How	Money	Corrupts	Congress	–	And	a	
Plan	to	Stop	it	(New	York	2011);		
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author-empowering	copyright	reforms	may	be	scant.		 I	suspect	that	we	may	end	up	concluding	that	the	more	promising	proposals	are	only	tangentially	related	to	copyright	law.		Many	creators	lack	the	bargaining	power	to	exercise	 the	 rights	 theoretically	 afforded	 to	 them	 by	 current	 law.110	 	 	 If	 the	 pivotal	problem	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 bargaining	power,	 though,	 new	or	 enhanced	 property	 rights	 are	unlikely	 to	solve	 it.	 It	 is	 just	remotely	possible	that	we	might	make	more	headway	by	attacking	the	problem	from	the	other	end.		There	may	be	interventions	to	address	the	bargaining	 power	 deficit	more	 directly.	 	 Catherine	 Fisk	 has	 argued	 that	 encouraging	authors	to	engage	in	collective	bargaining	may	be	the	most	practical	solution,	even	if	the	price	of	 that	bargaining	would	be	 the	 loss	of	 copyright	ownership.111	 	 I	 can	 	 imagine	requiring	the	collecting	entities	that	don't	currently	pay	the	creators'	share	of	royalties	directly	to	creators	to	do	so	from	now	on.112	 	Some	scholars	have	suggested	that	self-publishing	over	the	Internet	may	allow	creators	to	compete	directly	with	intermediaries	and	to	collect	a	larger	share	of	the	proceeds	from	their	works.113	My	colleague	Jeremy	Peters	has	suggested	that	we	could	get	a	lot	of	mileage	from	encouraging	or	requiring		copyright	 owners	 to	 adopt	 generally	 recognized	 accounting	 standards,	 along	 with	mandated,	 publicly-available	 annual	 audits.	 	 	 I	 suspect	 we	 might	 get	 somewhere	 by	imposing	labelling	rules	that	required	purveyors	of	copies	of	or	access	to	copyrighted	works	 to	 disclose	 the	 percentage	 of	 the	 purchase	 price	 that	will	 be	 paid	 directly	 to	creators	of	the	work.114	It	might	be	useful	to	set	up	and	fund	government	or	non-profit	organizations	 tasked	 with	 educating	 and	 supporting	 creators	 in	 appreciating	 and	enforcing	their	current	legal	rights	against	the	entities	to	which	they’ve	transferred	their	copyrights.115		
                                               110		See,	e.g.,	Bently,	note	41	above	;	Ginsburg	&		Sirinelli,		note	60	above;	O'Rourke,	note	32	above.		111		See	Catherine	Fisk,	“Hollywood	Writers	and	the	Gig	Economy”	(2018)	2017	University	of	Chicago	Legal	Forum	177.			112		See,	e.g.,	Future	of	Music	Coalition,	Principles	for	Artist	Compensation	in	New	Business	Models,	2	April	2009,	at	https://www.futureofmusic.org/article/article/principles-artist-compensation-new-business-models.			113		See	e.g.,	Jon	M.	Garon,	“Digital	Hollywood	2.0:		Reimagining	Film,	Music,	Television	and	Publishing	Distribution	as	a	Global	Artist	Collaborative”	(2013)	21	Mich.	St.	Int'l		Law	Review	563;	O'Rourke,	note	32	above,	at	638.		114		Cf.	Rebecca	Giblin,	The	Author	Made	3p	from	the	Sale	of	this	Book,	The	Author's	Interest	Blog,	3	April	2018,	at	https://authorsinterest.org/2018/04/03/more-on-fair-trade-for-authors/.			115		E.g.,		O'Rourke,	note	32	above,	at	pp.	637-38.	See	generally	Bowker,	Self-Publishing	in	the	United	States	2010-15	(2015),	at	http://media.bowker.com/documents/bowker-selfpublishing-report2015.pdf;	Robert	Shapiro	&	Siddartha	Aneja,	Unlocking	the	Gates:	America's	New	Creative	
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	 None	 of	 these	 approaches	 comes	 from	 the	 copyright	 scholar's	 usual	 toolbox.		There's	value,	 though,	 in	exploring	 the	 copyright	 system	 from	unaccustomed	vantage	points.		If	nothing	else,	it	can	help	us	to	appreciate	what	we	tend	not	to	see	and	why	we	don't	see	it.					
                                               Economy	(2018),	at	http://www.recreatecoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ReCreate-Creative-Economy-Study-Report.pdf.	
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